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Kerry Wilkins* Of Provinces and
Section 35 Rights
It is now well established that federal law and regulatory activity may interfere with
the exercise of aboriginal peoples' existing treaty and aboriginal rights, despite
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, whenever the federal government canjustify the interference. It is not yet clear, though, what power, if any, Canada's
provinces have to regulate, even in justified ways, such rights and their exercise.
This article argues that the provinces, as a general rule, have no such authority.
Except in certain very specific and isolated circumstances, they have no power,
even apart from s. 35, to regulate the exercise of s. 35 rights, because such rights
lie within the core of exclusive federal authority unders. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867. Nothing in the Constitution Act, 1982 modifies that original incapacity.
Section 88 of the federal Indian Act, which sometimes gives limited federal effect
to certain provincial laws, itself stands in need of justification when, because of
it, such laws do constrain the exercise of such rights. The better view is thats. 88's
own impact on such rights cannot be justified.
De nos jours il est bien reconnu que, malgr6 'art 35 de la Loi constitutionnelle de
1982, les lois et r~glements f6d6raux peuvent s'ing6rer dans I'exercice par les
autochtones de leurs droits ancestraux et issus de trait6 si le gouvernement
f~deralpeutjustifiercette intrusion. N6anmoins, il n'estpas encore 6vident quelle
autorit6 peut 6tre exercee par les provinces canadiennes pour r6glementer, i
juste titre, de tels droits etpratiques. L'auteurpretend que les provinces, de fagon
g6n~rale, n'ont aucune autorit6 a cet egard. Elles n'ont de tel droit que dans
certaines situations bien particulieres; de plus, elles n'ont pas I'autorite de
r6glementerl'exercice des droits identifies dans 'art. 35 carces droits se trouvent
au coeur de I'autorite f6derale exclusive identifide dans 'art. 91(24) de la Loi
constitutionnelle de 1867. II ny a rien dans la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 qui
modifie cette incapacit6. L'art. 88 de la Loi sur les Indiens, qui rend valide, de
fagon limit6e, certaines lois provinciales qui affectent les autochtones, a lui-
m6me besoin d'6tre justifie quand il a pour effet de contraindre I'exercice des
droits prot6ges par 'art. 35. Le poids de I'opinion conclut que I'effet de 'art. 88 sur
de tels droits ne saurait 6tre justifi6.
* Of the Ontario bar. Special thanks to Kent McNeil, for very helpful suggestions on an earlier
draft of this article, and for access before publication to recent related work of his own. Thanks
also to Patrick Macklem, Lisa DeMarco, Dick Risk and Carol Rogerson for the insights they
shared in formative conversations while this work was in progress, and to members of the
Aboriginal Legal Contacts group at Ontario's Ministry of the Attorney General for useful
comments on an oral presentation based on an earlier version of this material. Remaining
infelicities are, of course, my fault, not theirs. And no one should assume that views expressed
here are those of the ministry.
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Introduction
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982' gives constitutional recognition
and protection to the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada." In Sparrow,2 the first decision in which it considered
this provision, the Supreme Court of Canada prescribed the relationship
between s. 35 rights and federal authority. When federal regulatory
activity "affects the exercise of aboriginal rights," the Court said, it "will
nonetheless be valid, if it meets the test for justifying an interference with
1. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11.
2. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow].
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a right recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1)." 3 Subsequent decisions
elaborating on thejustification inquiry4 have confirmed that government
action, like the legislation or regulations that authorize it, stands in need
of justification when it interferes with such rights. 5 Treaty rights stand in
the same relation to federal authority, and are subject to the same
standards of justification, as aboriginal rights. 6
But what about the relationship between s. 35 rights and Canada's
provinces? Are the provinces, like the federal government, in a position
to interfere with the exercise of s. 35 rights whenever they can justify
doing so?
There is at least one important difference between the federal and the
provincial orders of government in respect of s. 35 rights. In Delgamuukw,
the Supreme Court of Canada made it abundantly clear that the provinces
do not have, and have not had since Confederation, authority to.extinguish
aboriginal rights.7 This difference, though of obvious importance in
dealing with measures that date from before s. 35 took effect, will likely
have decreasing significance as years pass; it now seems almost certain
that s. 35 itself has precluded unilateral extinguishment of s. 35 rights,
even by the federal government, since taking effect in 1982.8 The more
interesting question today is whether the provinces may restrict or
regulate the use of such rights by means of measures that they canjustify.
It is tempting to suppose that they may, both for reasons of practicality
and for reasons of constitutional symmetry. At least twice the Supreme
Court has intimated its support for such a supposition.9 My own view is
that this supposition, despite its apparent initial appeal, has no defensible
doctrinal foundation. I will argue that the provinces are in a different, and
much less advantageous position than the federal government in respect
of s. 35 rights. My argument is that the provinces do not, as a general rule,
3. Ibid. at 1109. See generally ibid. at 1109-1110. For the original formulation of the
justification test, see ibid. at 1110, 1113-1119.
4. R. v.Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 at 1064-1067[hereinafterNikal];R. v. Gladstone, [1996]
2 S.C.R. 723 at 762-775 [hereinafter Gladstone]; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 at 130-135
[hereinafter Adams]; Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at 1107-1114 [hereinafter
Delgamuukw].
5. Quebec (A.G.) v. Canada (N.E.B.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159 at 185-186.
6. See R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 811-816, 820-822 [hereinafter Badger]; R. v.
Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393 at 413, 417 [hereinafter Sundown].
7. See Delgamuukw, supra note 4, at 1115-1123.
8. "Subsequent to s. 35(l) aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can only be regulated
or infringed consistent with the justificatory test laid out by this Court in Sparrow ": R. v. Van
der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 538 [hereinafter Van der Peet].
9. See R. v. Cbt,, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at 185 [hereinafter Cbtel; Delgamuukw, supra note 4
at 1107.
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have the option of justifying interferences with s. 35 rights because they
have no power whatever-except in certain very specific and isolated
circumstances °0-to interfere with the exercise of such rights. Simply
put, there is no tenable constitutional basis on which the provinces might
assert such authority.
The purpose of this article is to substantiate these conclusions in
greater detail. To do so, we shall have to situate s. 35 in a broader context,
charting its connections with the division of powers prescribed in the
Constitution Act, 1867" and with s. 88 of the Indian Act. 2
I. Section 35's Application to Provincial Activity
It was in 1996 that the Supreme Court first addressed s. 35's application
to provincial measures generally. 3 In Cbtj, the court acknowledged that
thej ustification test developed first in Sparrow 14 "was originally elucidated
in the context of a federal regulation which allegedly infringed an
aboriginal right" and that the "majority of recent cases which have
subsequently invoked the Sparrow framework have similarly done so
against the backdrop of a federal statute or regulation." Even so, the Court
said, it is
quite clear that the Sparrow test applies where a provincial law is alleged
to have infringed an aboriginal or treaty right in a manner which cannot be
justified: Badger, supra, at para. 85 (application of Sparrow test to
provincial statute which violated a treaty right). The text and purpose of
s. 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and provincial laws which
restrict aboriginal and treaty rights, and they should both be subject to the
same standard of constitutional scrutiny."
Considered strictly on its own terms, this proposition seems
unimpeachable. Section 35(1), as construed so far, articulates the kind
and degree of constitutional protection that existing treaty and aboriginal
rights are to have from government measures that would otherwise
10. See infra notes I I 1-127 and the accompanying text.
11. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. 5
[hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867 or 1867 Act].
12. R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 [hereinafter Indian Act].
13. A few months earlier, in Badger, supra note 6, the Court had applied s. 35 to provincial
legislation in the very special circumstances arising from the operation of Alberta's Natural
Resources Transfer Agreement ("NRTA") and the "Government of the country" clause
included in Treaty 8. See infra notes 114-123, 142-149 and the accompanying text.
14. See supra notes 2-4 and the accompanying text.
15. Cbtj, supra note 9 at 185.
Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights
restrict them.'6 Nothing in the text or operation of s. 35(1) suggests that
such rights are meant to receive any greater or lesser protection from the
federal than from the provincial measures that govern them. 7 Where the
issue is justification of an infringement of these rights, it makes good
sense to have a single coherent general approach to the task of determining,
case by case, when it is the right itself, and when the measure constraining
it, that should prevail.
So understood, however, this observation tells us nothing useful about
the provinces' power to interfere with s. 35 rights; all it does is confirm
that the regime prescribed in Sparrow applies to any provincial measures
that constrain the exercise of such rights. It is here that we must be
extremely careful. The justification inquiry does not properly even begin
until one has identified a government measure that can and does interfere
with the exercise of an existing aboriginal or treaty right; till then, s. 35(1)
has no work to do, because there is nothing that stands in need of any
justification. Such rights do not need to look to s. 35(1) for protection
from measures that, for other reasons, can have no enforceable legal
effect on their exercise. But government measures cannot have any such
effect unless the governments undertaking them already have the power,
apart from s. 35, to interfere with such rights. Any such power depends
on their antecedent constitutional authority.
In this sense, as the British Columbia Court of Appeal has said, the
s. 35 inquiry "stands as a separate and subsequent review, which is
16. As far as I know, no court has yet considered the extent, if any, to which s. 35( 1 ) protects
such rights from interference resulting from wholly private activity. It is worth remembering,
though (as Patrick Macklem reminded me), that s. 35 rights are not necessarily in the same
position as the rights guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Charter
rights, because of s. 32 of the Charter, are enforceable only against the federal, provincial and
territorial legislatures and governments and against certain other entities exercising powers
derived from them: see, e.g., R. W.D.S. U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [ 1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 597-
601; Eldridge v. B.C. (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 654-666. Section 35 rights, on the other
hand, are not subject to the constraints that s. 32 imposes because s. 35 is not part of the Charter.
It remains to be seen whether the courts will read a "government action" constraint, as well as
a justification constraint, into s. 35(1).
17. Compare, e.g., Sparrow, supra note 2, at 1110:
While [s. 35] does not promise immunity from government regulation in a society that,
in the twentieth century, is increasingly more complex, interdependent and sophisticated,
and where exhaustible resources need protection and management, it does hold the
Crown to a substantive promise. The government is required to bear the burden of
justifying any legislation that has some negative effect on any aboriginal right protected
under s. 35(1).
For an argument in support of this view, see K. J. Tyler, "The Division of Powers and
Aboriginal Water Rights Issues" in National Symposium on Water Law, Canadian Bar
Association, Environmental Law Section (April 1999) at 72-73.
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properly done after division of powers issues have been resolved." 8 Like
the Charter of Rights, s. 35(1) "assumes the existence of legislative
powers"; as a result, "in reviewing the validity of a law, the first question
is whether the law is within the law-making power of the enacting
body."' 19 If it is not, no subsequent question of its compliance with s. 35
(or with the Charter) can arise.
There is, of course, no reason-at least for purposes of Canadian law-
to doubt the federal government's constitutional authority to enact laws
or implement measures that regulate the exercise of s. 35 rights. Section
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 confers on the federal order full and
exclusive authority to make laws in relation to "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians," and the Supreme Court has made it quite clear
that s. 35 does not displace that authority. 0 The question here is whether
the provinces have such power, as well.
It is possible, of course, to read the passage cited above from Cbtil2I as
a straightforward affirmation that provinces do have antecedent power to
regulate the use of s. 35 rights. About a year later, in Delgamuukw, the
Supreme Court appears to have interpreted it in that way.2 In due course,
we shall have to consider this interpretation in some detail.2 To do so
thoughtfully, however, we need first to reacquaint ourselves with the
doctrinal context within which the issue of provincial capacity arises. In
particular, we need to understand fully what it means that the constitution
has assigned authority over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians"
exclusively to the federal order of government.
18. R. v. Alphonse, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 401 (B.C.C.A.) at 419 [hereinafter Alphonse]. I owe
this reference to Kent McNeil, who makes a very similar point in his article "Aboriginal Title
and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" (1998) 61 Sask.
L. Rev. 431 at 450 [hereinafter McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction"]. See also N. Bankes,
"Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some Implications
for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317 at 320 ("an aboriginal plaintiff
need only plead infringement and a provincial government can only argue justification where
the provincial law passes muster in a division of powers sense").
19. See P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., abridged (Toronto: Carswell,
1997) at 339 [hereinafter Hogg, Constitutional Law]. Hogg's discussion here deals only with
the Charter and the division of powers; it applies, however, with equal force, by analogy, to
the relationship between the division of powers and s. 35.
20. "Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Federal legislative powers
continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be read together with
s. 35(l)... ": Sparrow, supra note 2, at 1109. Compare ibid. at 1110, quoted supra at note 17.
21. See supra note 15 and the accompanying text.
22. See Delgamuuksv, supra note 4, at 1107.
23. See infra notes 131-166 and the accompanying text.
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II. Section 35 Rights and the Division of Powers
The subjects "in relation to" which the provinces have authority to make
laws or to exercise the prerogatives of the Crown24 are those enumerated
in sections 92, 92A, 93 and 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. All subjects
not assigned exclusively to the provinces belong exclusively to the
federal order of government. 5 And all matters coming within the classes
of subjects assigned exclusively to federal authority are, as such, outside
provincial capacity,26 even if they also happen to fit within another class
of subjects assigned exclusively to the provinces. 27
24. The Constitution Act, 1867 distributes prerogative as well as legislative authority: it
vested in each order of government "such of these powers .. as were necessary for the due
performance of its constitutional functions ... ": Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada
v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick, [ 1892] A.C. 437 (P.C.) at 442. By contrast, the federal
and each provincial Crown has, as a general rule, all the powers of a natural person to enter into
contracts. Because a contract results from voluntary agreement among the parties, not from
unilateral imposition of rights or obligations, "[tihere is... no reason to confine the power to
contract within the limits of the power to legislate, and the courts have not done so": see
P. W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 163-166. But see infra
note 58.
25. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 9 1, preamble. See, e.g., Munro v. National Capital Commission,
[1966] S.C.R. 663 at 670; Jones v. N.B.(A.G.), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182 at 189.
26. Section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 assigns 29 classes of subjects exclusively to the
Parliament of Canada and says, at the end of that list: "And any Matter coming within any of
the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class
of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects
by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces."
27. See, e.g., C.P.R. v. B.C. (A.G.), [1950] A.C. 122 (P.C.), at 140; Canada (A.G.) v. C.P.R.
and C.N.R., [1958] S.C.R. 285 at 290,301; Canada (A.G.) v. C.N. Transportation Ltd., [1983]
2 S.C.R. 206 at 226-228 [CN Transportation].
Though this is the general proposition, courts recognized early that a few enumerated
heads of federal power are drawn so broadly that, taken full strength, they would leave little
or no room for the exercise of other, related heads of exclusive provincial authority. If the
federal government's plenary powers of taxation (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(3)) or over
"Marriage and Divorce" (s. 91(26)), for instance, were treated as superseding exceptions to
provincial authority, they could eclipse completely the narrower provincial authority to levy
direct taxes (s. 92(2)) or to regulate "The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province"
(s. 92(12)). Federal authority to regulate "Trade and Commerce" (s. 91(2)) is similarly broad.
In these few instances, the courts have construed the narrower provincial powers as exceptions
from the broader enumerated federal powers. See, e.g., Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v.
Parsons (1882), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) at 108-109; In re Marriage Legislation in Canada,
[ 1912] A.C. 880 (P.C.). These are illustrations of the more generaljudicial practice of "mutual
modification": construing the enumerated heads of provincial and federal authority in such a
way as to ensure that each of them has some meaningful range within which to operate. See,
in addition to the authorities just cited, Reference Re Waters and Water-Powers, [ 1929] S.C.R.
200 at 216-217 [hereinafter Water Powers Reference] and the sources cited there.
Another way in which the courts have sought to preserve flexibility, and considerable
room for overlap, in the exercise of federal and provincial authority is by characterizing very
similar federal and provincial measures as dealing with different, and equally valid, "matters."
192 Dalhousie Law Journal
"Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" are two of the classes of
subjects that the constitution has assigned exclusively to the federal
order.2 8 By doing so, the constitution has subtracted them from the classes
of subjects remitted to provincial authority, even though, again, almost
everything that is related either to "Indians" or to "lands reserved" can
also fairly be said to relate to "Property and Civil Rights in the Province,"29
or to some other head of exclusive provincial authority. 0 To understand
what powers the provinces have to control the use of s. 35 rights,
therefore, we need to begin by understanding the powers that s. 91(24) of
the Constitution Act, 1867 withholds from them.
1. Section 35 Rights and Federal Authority
a. The Structure of Federal Authority
We have seen that s. 91(24) gives the federal order certain exclusive
powers and that it confers the power to regulate the exercise of s. 35
rights.3 1 It does not follow automatically from these propositions that the
provinces do not have at least some power of their own to do so. Like the
other heads of federal authority listed in s. 91 of the Constitution Act,
1867, s. 91(24) serves two different purposes: it acts as a shield to insulate
certain matters altogether from provincial interference, and it acts as a
springboard to authorize a broader range of federal activity. These two
functions need to be kept conceptually distinct. 2
Section 91(24) operates as a shield because it assigns authority in
relation to "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" exclusively to
the federal government. This authority-again, like the other heads of
power listed in s. 91-has a "basic, minimum and unassailable content";3
within it are certain matters that Canada may regulate or determine
unilaterally and that the provinces may not. In this capacity, s. 91(24)
precludes provincial activity in relation to these "core" matters whether
or not the federal government exercises-ever-all, or any, of its
28. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24).
29. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(13).
30. "This legislative authority [ins. 91(24)] is obviously intended to be exercised over matters
that are, as regards persons other than Indians, within the exclusive authority of the Provinces":
R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 303, Pigeon J. (dissenting).
31. See supra note 20 and the accompanying text.
32. See Water Powers Reference, supra note 27 at 213.
33. Commission de la santi et de la sjcuriti du travail v. Bell Canada, [ 1988] 1 S.C.R. 749
at 839 [hereinafter Bell 88]. See also Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 at 497-498
[hereinafter Ordon Estate].
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authority in relation to them.34 As long ago as 1899, the Privy Council
confirmed that "[tihe abstinence of the Dominion Parliament from
legislating to the full limit of its powers could not have the effect of
transferring to any provincial legislature the legislative power which had
been assigned to the Dominion by s. 91 of the Act of 1867 ."3 The fact that
Canada may not have chosen, for example, to provide in legislation for
a certain class of people who qualify as "Indians" or for certain territory
that qualifies as "lands reserved" does not mean either that it nlay not do
so or that the provinces may.3 6 The answers to these capacity questions
depend on a proper understanding of the integral features of these federal
powers themselves.
There is an important difference, however, between this "core" of
exclusive federal authority and the full extent of the power that s. 91(24)
confers on the federal government. Section 91(24) does not restrict the
range of permissible federal regulation to matters wholly within its
shielded core;37 it can also authorize (as springboard) a wider range of
federal activity, even when such activity has effects on matters legitimately
within provincial authority,3" and even when the federal government
34. Compare D. Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces, and Aboriginal Peoples" in J. A.
Long & M. Boldt, eds., Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) [hereinafter Governments in Conflict] 151 at 156-
157 [hereinafter Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces"]; Bell 88, ibid. at 819-820; Ordon
Estate, ibid. at 487, 504, overruling Canadian National Steamships Co. v. Watson, [1939]
S.C.R. I1, which had suggested otherwise.
35. Union Colliery v. BrYden, [1899] A.C. 580 (P.C.) at 588, quoted with approval inNatural
Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [197612 S.C.R. 751 at 759-760, Laskin C.J.C. (for
the plurality) and in Bell 88, ibid. at 834. Compare Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v.
Saskatchewan (LabourRelations Board), [ 1980] 1 S.C.R. 433 at440, Laskin C.J.C. (concurring):
"[T]here is no accretion to provincial legislative authority by the failure or unwillingness of
Parliament to legislate to the full limit of its powers under s. 91 ."
36. Compare, e.g., Commission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966]
S.C.R. 767 (declaring provincial minimum wage laws inapplicable to federal undertaking even
in the absence of a legislated federal minimum wage).
37. For one thing, as Patrick Macklem has said, "Parliament is also entitled to pass laws
pursuant to other federal heads of power listed in the Constitution Act, 1867 and treat native
people the same as nonnative people": "First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the
Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382 at 416. See R. v. Derriksan (1976),
71 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.C.) (unreported in S.C.R.: see [1976] 2 S.C.R. v).
38. There is always room for dispute about whether federal measures aimed specifically at
Indians or at Indian lands, but lying outside the core of exclusive federal authority, are valid
exercises of federal power. As Kenneth Lysyk has observed,
Clearly an inquiry into the true nature and character of legislation for the purpose of
characterizing it in terms of constitutional distribution of legislative authority will not
be concluded by the fact that the enactment is limited in its application to a class of
persons mentioned in the British North America Act. The pith and substance of the
legislation may indeed be found to relate to the class of persons legislated for; but,
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could not engage in such measures in respect of Canadians generally. 39 It
does not, therefore, always preclude provincial activity when it authorizes
federal activity.40 The fact, for example, that Canada may validly regulate
dispositions of an Indian's assets on death,4' or highway traffic on
reserve,42 does not necessarily mean that the provinces too may not do
so.
4 3
alternatively, an examination of the enactment may disclose, to the court which
ultimately decides the issue, that the statute relates to the activity or subject matter which
it purports to regulate, despite the fact that it is made applicable to a limited class of
persons.
K. M. Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian" (1967) 45 Can. Bar
Rev. 513 at 533-534 [hereinafter Lysyk, "Unique Position"]. Compare K.M. Lysyk,
"Constitutional Developments Relating to Indians and Indian Lands: An Overview" [1978]
L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 201 (Lysyk, "Constitutional Developments") at 221.
The test for determining whether any given federal measure is a valid exercise of s. 91(24)
powers is (here, as elsewhere) whether its primary subject matter (or "pith and substance," if
you insist) is "sufficiently integrated" with matters clearly coming within the core of exclusive
federal authority to warrant characterizing it as "in relation to" that head of power. The degree
of integration (or "fit") required depends, in turn, on two things: the strength of the argument
for describing the matter as one reserved exclusively to the provinces, and the "gravitational
force" of the relevant federal head of power. Narrower, more specialized heads of federal
power, such as those conferred by s. 91(24), have, as a rule, more potent cores, capable of
anchoring a wider range of more distant measures, than broader, more diffuse powers, such as
the general power to regulate trade and commerce (s. 91(2)): see General Motors of Canada
v. City National Leasing, [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 at 671 and generally ibid. at 663 -672. Compare
supra note 27.
In part for that reason, perhaps, the courts have been quite generous about upholding
federal measures having to do with Indians or with lands reserved for the Indians. Kenneth
Lysyk predicted in 1978 that courts would be slow to reach the conclusion that any federal
legislation addressing Indians or Indian lands is ultra vires, at least in the absence of some
suggestion of colourability: Lysyk, "Constitutional Developments," ibid. at 221. And Douglas
Sanders was able to say in 1988, that "[t]here are no examples of federal Indian legislation being
declared unconstitutional:" Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces," supra note 34 at 156.
The one undeniable constraint on the scope of Canada's "springboard" authority under
s. 91(24) is that Canada may not seek to appropriate provincial Crown lands for Indians' use,
e.g., as reserves: see Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold, [ 1903] A.C. 73 (P.C.) at 79-82 [hereinafter
Seybold]; WaterPowers Reference, note 27 at 211,214; R. v. Smith, [ 1983] 1 S.C.R. 554 at 571-
572, 575-577 [hereinafter Smith]. See infra note 58.
39. See, e.g., Lysyk, "Unique Position", ibid. at 533; Sanders, "The Constitution, the
Provinces," ibid. at 152.
40. See, e.g., Water Powers Reference, supra note 27 at 213; Robinson v. Countrywide
Factors Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 805.
41. See Indian Act; ss. 42-50; Canada (A.G.) v. Canard, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 [hereinafter
Canard].
42. See R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025 [hereinafter Francis 88].
43. In Francis 88, ibid., for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of
Canada's Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations, C.R.C. 19.78, c. 959, but upheld a conviction for
a violation on reserve of a provincial highway traffic statute. Compare Multiple Access Ltd. v.
McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, where the Court upheld virtually identical provisions
regulating insider trading in both the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Ontario
Securities Act.
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A good way to understand and distinguish these two different func-
tions in operation is by trying to work through the confusion that
sometimes surrounds such central terms as "Indians" and "reserve." The
Indian Act gives "Indian" a very particular meaning for the purposes of
that statute," but the class of individuals prescribed in that definition is
in some respects narrower, 45 and in others probably broader, than the class
of those who come within the core of exclusive federal authority over
"Indians."46 We know, for example, that Inuit are "Indians" for purposes
of s. 91 (24),47 even though the Indian Act specifically excludes them from
its reach;48 as a result, the provinces have no power to legislate in relation
to them as such. At the same time, most non-native women who
happened, before 1985, to marry men that the Indian Act defined as
"Indian" still qualify as Indians as defined in the Indian Act,49 but
probably do not come within exclusive federal authority pursuant to s.
91(24). So it is too with "reserves" and "Indian lands." We have known
for over a century that "the words actually used [in s. 91(24)] are,
according to their natural meaning, sufficient to include all lands re-
served, upon any terms or conditions, for Indian occupation, ' 5° not just
those lands that are known, or defined in the IndianAct, as "reserves." We
now know that they also encompass "lands held pursuant to aboriginal
title," whether or not such lands have ever been "set apart by Her
Majesty for the use and benefit of a band. ' 52 In these respects, the class
of lands that the Indian Act regards as reserves is narrower than the class
of lands that s. 91(24) itself assigns to the core of federal authority. On the
other hand, the Indian Act applies, as well, to all lands "set apart for the
use and benefit of a band" -- even, one must assume, those lands that
44. See Indian Act, ss. 2(1) ("Indian"), 5-7. See also s. 4.1, which deems references to
"Indians" in the Act to include, for most but not all purposes, individuals whose names are
entered, and are entitled to be entered, on band lists. On band lists, see ss. 2(1) ("Band List"),
7-14.2.
45. See Lysyk, "Unique Position," supra note 38 at 515.
46. On Indians and s. 91(24) generally, see Clem Chartier, "'Indian': An Analysis of the Term
As Used in S. 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867" (1978-79) 43 Sask. L. Rev. 37.
47. Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104; R. v. Sigeareak, [1966] S.C.R. 645.
48. See Indian Act, s. 4(1).
49. Ibid., ss. 6(l)(a), 7 (as am. by R.S.C. 1985 (1st Supp.), c. 32, s. 4), incorporating R.S.C.
1985, c. 1-5, s. I l(l)(f).
50. St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1889), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 59
[hereinafter St. Catherine's Milling]. See also B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights"
(1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 773, [hereinafter Slattery, "Understanding"].
5 1. Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1117.
52. See Indian Act, s. 2(1) ("reserve") for the current statutory definition of "reserve," which
includes these words.
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private persons may choose on their own to hold in trust for bands 53-
whether or not such lands also happen to qualify as "Lands reserved for
the Indians." To reduce confusion here, I will use "s. 91(24) Indians" to
refer to those peoples who come within exclusive federal authority
pursuant to s. 91(24) and "statutory Indians" to those who qualify as
Indians pursuant to provisions of the Indian Act. So too, I will save the
word "reserves" for those lands that satisfy the tests for "reserves" in the
Indian Act, and use "lands reserved," "Indian lands" or "s. 91(24) lands"
to refer generically to the lands that s. 91(24) shields from provincial
authority.
For present purposes, therefore, it will make a significant difference
whether s. 35 rights are part of the "core" that s. 91(24) shields from
provincial interference, or merely matters that have sufficient connection
with that core to come within the range of the "springboard" jurisdiction
that s. 91(24) confers on Canada. If they are "springboard" matters, then
the provinces too will often have power to regulate their exercise14 -
subject, of course, to the constraints of s. 35 5 5-as long as the measures
they implement do not conflict with valid and relevant federal initiatives.5
6
If, on the other hand, they form part of the "basic, minimum and
unassailable content" of s. 91(24), then, as discussed in more detail
below, the provinces have no such power in ordinary circumstances, at
least according to the standard division of powers doctrine.
As the next section demonstrates, the s. 35 rights of s. 91(24) Indians
are indeed integral to federal authority over "Indians, and Lands reserved
for the Indians."
53. See ibid., s. 36 ("Where lands have been set apart for the use and benefit of a band and
legal title thereto is not vested in HerMajesty, this Act applies as though the lands were a reserve
within the meaning of this Act").
54. "[N]otwithstanding s. 91(24), provincial laws of general application applyproprio vigore
to Indians and Indian lands": Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1120.
55. See supra notes 14-17 and the accompanying text.
56. Federal authority over the subjects listed in s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is not only
exclusive; it also operates "notwithstanding anything in this Act": Constitution Act, 1867,
s. 91, opening words. As a result, the realization of valid federal objectives takes precedence-
is "paramount"-over the realization of competing provincial objectives, even when the
provincial objectives are in every other respect valid and appropriate: see, e.g., Tennant v.
Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A.C. 31 (P.C.) at 45; Ontario (A. G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1894]
A.C. 189 (P.C.) at 201. For a different, but compatible view of the origins of paramountcy
doctrine, see Reference Re Provincial Court Judges, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 71 (paramountcy
doctrine "follows from the desire of the confederating provinces [expressed in the preamble to
the Constitution Act, 18671 'to be federally united into One Dominion').) See generally Hogg,
Constitutional Law, supra note 19 at 384-385, esp. n. 10.
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b. Section 35 Rights and Core Federal Authority
i. Section 91(24) Lands
As mentioned above, "Lands reserved for the Indians" include "all lands
reserved, upon any terms and conditions, for Indian occupation," whether
or not (one must assume) those lands are currently occupied by (s. 91(24))
Indians. This description must include all lands that s. 91(24) Indians
have received or retained pursuant to treaty; in Deigamuukw, the Supreme
Court removed any doubt that it also includes all "lands held pursuant to
aboriginal title."57 Canada's constitutional authority over any such lands
throughout most of the country terminates forthwith upon the
extinguishment or absolute surrender of the aboriginal interest in them. 8
As long as some aboriginal possessory interest, even a mere reversionary
57. See supra notes 50-51 and the accompanying text.
58. According to Smith, supra note 38 at 564,
[t]he lands 'reserved' for the benefit of Indians, on being released by the Indians for
whose benefit the lands had been set aside, cease thereby in law to be within the
legislative reach of Parliament under the Constitution .... The effect of a complete
release, therefore, would be the withdrawal of these lands from Indian use within the
contemplation of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act.
See also ibid. at 569,578; Seybold, supra note 38 at 82. This is so because the federal authority
over such lands is legislative and administrative only; s. 91(24) gives Canada no proprietary
interest in Indian lands: St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 50 at 59-60; Seybold, ibid. at 82,
Smith, ibid. at 564. When most of Canada's provinces joined Confederation, the underlying
title to the Indian lands within their borders was vested in the Crown in right of that province,
subject only to the Indian interest: Constitution Act, 1867, s. 109; St. Catherine's Milling, ibid.
at 54-60. Because the provincial interest in such lands is only proprietary, and is subject to the
aboriginal interest while that interest remains, only the federal government has constitutional
authority to extinguish, or to accept surrender of, the aboriginal interest: Delgamuukw, supra
note 4 at 1117-1118. Once the aboriginal interest in particular lands is extinguished or
surrendered absolutely, however, the proprietary interest of the province in such lands becomes
complete; the federal government no longer has any power of its own to deal with them:
St. Catherine's Milling, ibid. at 54-55, 58, 60; Smith, ibid. at 562.
One consequence was that Canada, once it accepted an absolute surrender of particular
lands in exchange for a promise to deal with those lands in a particular way, had no independent
capacity to carry out its promise. (Smith is a clear and recent example.) One might have thought
that this predicament would prompt more inquiry about the validity of those surrenders, given
the misrepresentations of federal capacity on which they may well have been based.
Reciprocal legislation in Ontario (see S.C. 1924, c. 48; S.O. 1924, c. 15), New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia and British Columbia now authorizes Canada to deal with surrendered reserve
lands in accordance with the terms of the surrenders and confirms retroactively, subject to some
qualifications, the grants of surrendered Indian lands that Canada had purported to make in
fulfilment of such terms. For discussion of the New Brunswick arrangement, see Smith, ibid.
at 578-580.
The situation is different in the three Prairie provinces. Initially, the Crown in right of
Canada held underlying title to all the lands and resources in those provinces, including of
course the s. 91(24) lands. That changed in 1930, when the federal government signed NRTAs
with each of those provinces, transferring underlying title to them. The Constitution Act, 1930,
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interest, survives in the relevant lands, they remain "lands reserved" and
subject to federal legislative and administrative authority. 9 We need to
know what powers in respect of those lands, while they remain s. 91(24)
lands, are exclusive to Canada.
From Delgamuukw we know that the federal order has exclusive
authority, at a minimum, to legislate or to use state power in relation to
aboriginal title as such or in relation to any other aboriginal rights that are
tied to land.60 There is every reason to conclude that the same is true of
federal authority over s. 91(24) lands held pursuant to treaty and over
other treaty rights that pertain to particular lands. All indications are that
the exclusive core of federal power over lands reserved is extremely
broad, and may even be plenary.6' In Derrickson, for example, the
Supreme Court concluded that "[tihe right to possession of lands on an
Indian reserve is manifestly of the very essence of the federal exclusive
legislative power under s. 91(24)."62 In reaching that conclusion, it
endorsed Kenneth Lysyk's observation that "the matters contained
within exclusive federal authority over Indian reserve lands [presumably]
include regulation of the manner of land-holding, disposition of interests
in reserve lands and how reserve lands may be used (e.g., zoning
20-21 Geo. V., c. 26 (U.K.) [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1930] gives these agreements
constitutional effect. Each of those agreements, however, specifically retains under federal
ownership "[aill lands included in Indian reserves within the Province, including those selected
and surveyed but not yet confirmed, as well as those confirmed" and incorporates by reference,
with appropriate regional changes, the provisions of Canada's 1924 agreement with Ontario
for the disposition of surrendered reserve lands: see ss. 10-11 of the Saskatchewan and Alberta
NRTAs, ss. 11- 12 of the Manitoba NRTA, and Reference Re Stony Plain Indian Reserve No.
135 (1981), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 636 at 645-650 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter Re Stony Plain]. For
discussion of these various arrangements, see Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces,"
supra note 34 at 159.
59. See, e.g., R. v. St. Ann's Shooting and Fishing Club Ltd., [1950] S.C.R. 211 at 215-219;
Surrey (Corporation a]) v. Peace Arch Enterprises (1974), 74 W.W.R. 380 at 386 (B.C.C.A.);
Western Izdustrial Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd. (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 424
at 426, Prowse J.A. (dissenting), at 434-436, Morrow J.A. (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter Sarcee];
Re Stony Plain, ibid. at 650-653.
60. See Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1118-19. These determinations were essential to the
Court's conclusion that provinces have no independent power to extinguish aboriginal title or
other aboriginal rights. For this reason, they surely must take precedence over the Court's
incidental reference, earlier in the same judgment (ibid. at 1113) to "provinces enact[ingl
hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands." This reference, offered only as
an illustration of the justification requirements for aboriginal title infringements, clearly cannot
stand together with its later conclusions about the core of federal authority over s. 91(24) lands.
61. For a different view, see Oka (Municipaliti) c. Simon, [19991 2 C.N.L.R. 205 at 221-224
(Que. C.A.) [hereinafter Oka]; Tyler, supra note 17 at 5-9. Both Tyler and the Court in Oka,
ibid. acknowledge, however, that aboriginal title, as such, comes within the core of exclusive
federal authority.
62. Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285 at 296 [hereinafter Derrickson].
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regulations). '63 Lysyk, for his part, had derived this list "[b]y analogy"
from a list of provincial powers in relation to land that the Supreme Court
had held in an earlier case were "not contested."' The implication is that
Canada has exclusive authority to act in relation to Indian lands65 in the
same ways, and in relation to all the same matters, available to the
provinces in relation to other lands within provincial boundaries. 66 If this
is so, then the provinces have no power of their own to act in relation to
any such matters as they pertain to any Indian lands.
Other authority supports the breadth of this inference. In St. Catherine's
Milling, the Privy Council, having just confirmed the natural breadth of
the words "Lands reserved" in s. 91(24), observed that "[i]t appears to be
the plain policy of the [1867] Act that, in order to ensure uniformity of
administration, all such lands, and Indian affairs generally, shall be under
the legislative control of one central authority. '67 Almost a century later,
in Smith, the Supreme Court of Canada characterized the aboriginal
interest in s. 91(24) lands as a "right... to enjoy the use of the land under
federal legislative regulation. '68 This description makes sense only if the
federal regulation is understood to be exclusive; it would be hard for
anyone to characterize exposure to an additional level of regulation as any
kind of "right." It appears, therefore, that the power to govern the use or
disposition of aboriginal title, or of other s. 35 rights that relate to specific
land, resides exclusively with the federal order of government. 69
ii. Section 91(24) Indians
The preceding discussion suggests that the core of exclusive federal
authority over s. 91(24) lands is virtually coextensive with the full extent
of that power. If that is so, it is a contingent fact about that particular head
63. Ibid. at 295, citing Lysyk, "Constitutional Developments," supra note 38 at 227 n. 49.
64. Lysyk, "Constitutional Developments," ibid., citing Morgan v. P.E.L (A.G.), [1976]
2 S.C.R. 349 at 357.
65. It is true that Derrickson, supra note 62, dealt exclusively with possessory interests in a
reserve, not with aboriginal interests in Indian lands generally. For present purposes, though,
this makes no difference, because the aboriginal interest is the same in reserve lands and in
s. 91(24) lands: see Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 379, citing Quebec (A.G.) v.
Canada (A.G.), [1921] 1 A.C. 401 (P.C.) at 410-411.
66. For recent authority to this effect, see Stoney Creek Indian Band v. The Queen, [1999]
1 C.N.L.R. 192 (B.C.S.C.) at 213 [hereinafter Stoney Creek] ("inadmissible interference with
a right tied to or encompassed within the right to exclusive possession, use, benefit and full
enjoyment of reserve lands"); Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (A.G.) (30 April 1999)
(Ont. S.C.J.) [unreported] at 146-147 (para. 477) [hereinafter Chippewas of Sarnia].
67. St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 50 at 59.
68. Snith, supra note 38 at 564.
69. To the best of my knowledge, Brian Slattery recognized this first. See Slattery,
"Understanding," supra note 50 at 773-777.
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of federal authority. This is not the pattern for heads of federal power
generally; we should not expect the same result when considering federal
authority over s. 91(24) Indians. ° As the Supreme Court observed in
Four B, "the conferring upon Parliament of exclusive legislative
competence to make laws relating to certain classes of persons does not
mean that the totality of these persons' rights and duties comes under
primary federal competence to the exclusion of provincial laws of general
application."'" Four B confirmed that Canada does not have exclusive
power to regulate the labour relations of corporations owned by Indians
operating on reserve and employing Indians. We know, as well, that the
power to regulate highway traffic on reserve is not exclusive to the federal
order of government,72 and that the power to regulate Indians' hunting and
trapping, on or off reserve, may not be, either.7 3
The "basic, minimum and unassailable content"7 4 of the federal
order's authority over "Indians" -that part of its authority that is
exclusively federal-appears to be the power to deal with them, and to
deal with matters unique to and characteristic of them (or with some
subgroup of them) as such.75 This power is sometimes described in the
70. See, e.g., supra notes 37-43 and the accompanying text.
71. FourB Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers ofAmerica, [1980] 1S.C.R. 1031
at 1048 [hereinafter Four B]. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1119-1120.
72. See Francis 88, supra note 42.
73. See Cardinal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1974] 2 S.C.R. 695 [hereinafter Cardinal] (Indian
hunting on reserve); R. v. Kruger & Manuel, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 [hereinafter Kruger &
Manuel] (Indian hunting off reserve). One must now treat these cases with some caution.
Neither involved a claim of aboriginal or treaty right, and Cardinal, in particular, was decided
mainly on the basis of s. 12 of the Alberta NRTA (supra note 58), which specifically provides
that "the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the
Indians within the boundaries thereof," subject to certain exceptions and limitations: see
Cardinal, ibid. at 698-699. Pursuant to s. I of the Constitution Act, 1930, this provision, and
the equivalent provisions in the NRTAs with Saskatchewan and Manitoba, operate
"notwithstanding anything in the British North America Act, 1867 ... ," including, of course,
s. 91(24). Cardinal, therefore, is hardly a sound basis on which to ascertain the dimensions of
the core of exclusive federal power over s. 91(24) Indians.
See also R. v. Dick, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309 at 320-321 [hereinafter Dick 85], where the
Supreme Court, despite Cardinal, assumed, without deciding, that restrictions on hunting, at
least in relation to the members of one specific Indian band, were matters that came within the
core of exclusive federal authority, and St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 50 at 60, where the
Privy Council observed that Canada "still possesses exclusive power to regulate the Indians'
privilege of hunting and fishing" in the Treaty 3 area despite the fact that Ontario alone acquired
the beneficial interest in those lands upon their surrender to the Crown.
74. See supra note 33 and the accompanying text.
75. See R. v. Martin (1917), 41 O.L.R. 79 (C.A.) at 83, quoted with approval in Cardinal,
supra note 73 at 706.
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cases as the power to regulate "Indians qua Indians ' 7 6 or matters related
to "Indianness. '77
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court affirmed that this "core of
Indianness encompasses the whole range of aboriginal rights that are
protected by s. 35(l)" of the Constitution Act, 1982.78 As the court itself
has acknowledged,79 this conclusion follows necessarily from its earlier
determination in Van der Peet that such rights derive exclusively from
"practices, customs and traditions that are integral to distinctive aboriginal
cultures.., that occupied North America prior to the arrival of Europeans."
0
Aboriginal rights, by their very nature, are a kind of rights that only
aboriginal peoples, as such, can have.
It seems equally clear, as a matter of constitutional law,8' that the
exercise and disposition of Indian treaty rights are subject exclusively to
federal legislative authority.82 In Simon, the court observed with approval
that "[i]t has been held to be within the exclusive power of Parliament
under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, to derogate from rights
recognized in a treaty agreement made with the Indians." 3 From a
76. See, e.g., Cardinal, ibid. at 706; Kruger& Manuel, supra note 73 at 110; Four B, supra
note 71 at 1048; Dick 85, supra note 73 at 320, 325, 326, 328.
77. See, e.g., Delgamuukw. supra note 4 at 1119: Natural Parents, supra note 35 at 760-761,
Laskin C.J.C. (for the plurality), quoted with approval in Bell 88, supra note 33 at 835.
78. Delgamuukw, ibid. at 1119. "Those rights," the court added (ibid.), "include rights in
relation to land; that part of the core derives from s. 91(24)' s reference to 'Lands reserved for
the Indians.' But those rights also encompass practices, customs and traditions which are not
tied to land as well; that part of the core can be traced to federal jurisdiction over 'Indians."'
79. Ibid. at 1121.
80. Van der Peet, supra note 8 at 549. See generally ibid. at 548-549. Compare Bankes, supra
note 18 at 332-333.
81. According to s. 88 of the Indian Act, provincial laws of general application are "[slubject
to the terms of any treaty." This provision itself protects the rights set out in Indian treaties from
the impact of any provincial laws to which s. 88 applies: see, e.g., R. v. George, [ 1966] S.C.R.
267 at 281 [hereinafter George]; Kruger & Manuel, supra note 73 at 114-115; R. v. Simon,
[198512 S.C.R. 387 at 410-414 [hereinafter Sinon); Quebec (A.G.) v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1025 at 1065 [hereinafter Sioui]. Such protection lasts, however, only while s. 88 is in force.
(It first took effect in 1951 .)
82. It follows that I disagree on this point with Patrick Macklem, who said, albeit with regret,
in 1991, that "[t]reaty rights can be asserted against valid provincial laws not because they
constrict the exercise of legislative authority but because Parliament has stated in s. 88 of the
Indian Act that provincial laws of general application shall not infringe treaty guarantees":
Macklem, supra note 37 at 436. See also ibid. at 438, 442.
83. Simon, supra note 81 at 411. Compare Badger, supra note 6 at 809, where the Supreme
Court said, in a case focused on treaty rights, that "the regulation of Indian hunting rights would
ordinarily come within the jurisdiction of the Federal government and not the Province." See
also R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 (B.C.C.A.) at 618, Davey J.A. (for the
plurality), aff'd on related grounds [1965] S.C.R. vi, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 491, approved in Kruger
& Manuel, supra note 73 at 113, Dick 85, supra note 73 at 324 and Simon, ibid. at 411; Hogg,
Constitutional Law, supra note 19 at 566 esp. n. 54.
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doctrinal standpoint, this conclusion makes compelling sense. Indian
treaties are arrangements negotiated and concluded with communities of
s. 91(24) Indians, acting as such, because of the distinctive legal interests-
and, at least in the early days, the autonomy-such communities, uniquely,
have possessed. 84 The power to conclude such treaties is exclusive to
Canada85 because only the federal government has authority to extinguish
(or accept surrender of) such interests,86 or otherwise to govern or regulate
their exercise.87 To suppose that the rights set out in treaties, and offered
as consideration for the surrender of some such interests, become (for the
first time) routinely subject to constraint by provincial law is to create
substantial disincentives for both parties to participate in the treaty-
making process: for the aboriginal parties, because any rights they
received in exchange would be, as such, more vulnerable to external
interference than those they were being asked to give up,88 and for the
federal government, because it would lose the exclusive power to control
the use of such rights and would therefore be unable to guarantee, as a
matter of course, the integrity of the arrangements it was offering.
Implementation of the arrangements validly made in these treaties
demands the kind of "uniformity of administration" that, as the Privy
84. Sioui, supra note 81 at 1049-1056, esp. at 1056.
85. This does not mean, however, that the federal government automatically has the
constitutional authority to fulfill all the obligations it may choose to undertake when it enters
into an Indian treaty; see, e.g., supra note 58. Neither does it preclude the federal government
from making statutory provision for provincial involvement in the treaty-making process. In
at least one instance, Parliament has done exactly that. In 1891, the federal and Ontario
legislatures enacted reciprocal legislation authorizing Canada and Ontario to sign an agreement
settling questions arising from Treaty 3: see An Act for the settlement of certain questions
between the Governments of Canada and Ontario respecting Indian Lands, S.C. 1891, c. 5; An
Actfor the settlement of questions between the Governments of Canada and Ontario respecting
Indian Lands, S.O. 1891, c. 3 [hereinafter statutory agreement statutes]. (The agreement these
statutes authorized was executed in 1894.) According to s. 6 of this statutory agreement, "any
future treaties with the Indians in respect of territory in Ontario to which they have not hitherto
surrendered their claim aforesaid, shall be deemed to require the concurrence of the government
of Ontario." Such arrangements, however, though to the best of my knowledge still in force,
do not alter the fact that the provinces have no independent constitutional capacity to conclude
or participate in treaties with s. 91(24) Indians.
86. See Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1117-1118. Delgamuukw speaks exclusively of
aboriginal interests in land, but the argument applies equally to all the aboriginal rights
belonging to s. 91(24) Indians. Compare Slattery, "Understanding," supra note 50 at 763-764.
87. Supra notes 78-80 and the accompanying text.
88. Imagine, in particular, the predicament of those treaty peoples-the signatories of
Treaties 3,5 and 8 are examples-whose rights, and whose populations, extend into more than
one province. In the worst case, their identical entitlements under a single treaty would be
subject, on this hypothesis, to incompatible regulatory regimes in neighbouring provinces.
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Council recognized in St. Catherine's Milling, requires "the legislative
control of one central authority."89
2. Section 35 Rights and Provincial Authority
The above analysis demonstrates that the management, regulation and
disposition of s. 35 rights are notjust matters that happen to come within
the reach of federal power pursuant to s. 91(24 ) of tlle ,lrt.iiiuintUt Alci,
1867, but matters integral to that authority. They are, in other words,
matters the constitution withholds from provincialjurisdiction and reserves
exclusively to the federal order of government. Section 91(24), therefore,
prevents provincial 90 measures from controlling s. 35 rights not only
when such measures interfere with federal law, but absolutely. It does so
in two ways: it insulates such rights from the application of provincial
measures that in every other way are fully legitimate (the question of
application), and it precludes the provinces from making it their business
to control the use of such rights (the question of validity).9 It will be most
convenient to consider these two restrictions in reverse order.
a. The Question of Validity
To say of a regulatory measure that it is invalid is to say that it is beyond
the constitutional authority of (ultra vires) the enacting legislature or
government (federal or provincial). Invalid measures or provisions have
no legal effect whatever; once recognized as invalid, they cannot be
enforced against, or relied upon by, anyone. 92
89. Supra note 67 and the accompanying text. The situation is different, of course, when a
treaty itself makes allowance for the operation of provincial law. See infra notes 120-123 and
the accompanying text.
90. These limits apply with equal force to municipal authorities (because such municipalities
have had since Confederation only the powers provincial legislatures have conferred upon
them pursuant to s. 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867: Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.),
[ 1896] A.C. 348 (P.C.) at 364 [hereinafter Local Prohibition]; East York (Borough) v. Ontario
(1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 733 (C.A.) at 738) and to all other entities purporting to exercise delegated
provincial authority, because "a provincial Legislature cannot delegate any power which it
does not possess" (Local Prohibition, ibid.).
91. Compare Bankes, supra note 18 at 326, who uses a similar taxonomy.
92. "[lit may quite readily be deduced that anything done undercolourof an ultra vires statute
has no more effect than if the statute had not existed": Air Canada v. B.C., [ 198911 S.C.R. 1161
at 1195. As the court goes on to say, however, courts sometimes do give limited effect to
unconstitutional statutes in extraordinary circumstances, for reasons of public policy: ibid. at
1195-1196, 1203-1207 (retention of taxes collected under unconstitutional statutes). See also
Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234 (temporary suspension, to
preserve the rule of law, of declaration that all Manitoba statutes ultra vires).
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To be a valid exercise of provincial authority, a measure "must be
within the authority of s. 92 [of the Constitution Act, 1867] and must not
be in relation to a subject-matter assigned exclusively to the Canadian
Parliament under s. 91 ."93 The first of these two requirements is easy to
satisfy, given the breadth of some of the classes of subjects that s. 92
assigns to the provinces;94 almost all of a province's legislation and
executive activity is likely to qualify, as long as it is focused within the
province's territorial boundaries. The issue almost always concerns the
second requirement: whether the measure's primary focus is on matters
that, from a constitutional standpoint, are exclusively of federal concern.
If s. 35 rights are indeed among the matters integral to (at the core of)
federal authority under s. 91 (24),91 then any provincial measure found to
have been designed to govern them or their exercise will, by this second
test, be invalid.96 Setting out to regulate or to make provision for such
rights-or for any other matters that help define federal jurisdiction-is
something that provinces have no power to do.97 Strictly speaking, a
province's authority in respect of such matters is no greater than that of
an ordinary person.
93. Cardinal, supra note 73 at 703. This is so, again, because the matters at the core of the
powers conferred by s. 91 exclusively on Canada are, generally speaking, subtracted from the
core powers assigned to the provinces in s. 92. See the closing words of s. 91, quoted supra note
26, and generally supra notes 24-30 and the accompanying text.
94. Sections 92(13) and 92(16), for instance, authorize provincial activity in relation to
"Property and Civil Rights in the Province" and "Generally [to] all Matters of a merely local
or private Nature in the Province," respectively.
95. Supra notes 57-89 and the accompanying text.
96. This is the primary reason why the Supreme Court concluded in Delgamuukw that
provinces have no power to extinguish aboriginal rights. Because, as the court said, "the only
laws with the sufficiently clearand plain intention to extinguish aboriginal rights would be laws
in relation to Indians and Indian lands, . . . a provincial law could never, proprio vigore,
extinguish aboriginal rights, because the intention to do so would take the law outside
provincial jurisdiction": Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1120-1121.
97. Although some others disagree (see, e.g., A. Pratt, "Federalism in the Era of Aboriginal
Self-Government" in D. C. Hawkes, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and Government Responsibility:
Exploring Federal and Provincial Roles (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989) 19 at 52-
53; B. Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar
Rev. 261 at 284 n. 75 [hereinafter Slattery, "Question of Trust"]) I believe there is good reason
to doubt that provinces have authority even to seek to insulate such core matters from the effects
of other provincial activity: to declare in legislation, for instance, that provincial hunting rules
shall not restrict the exercise of aboriginal rights that belong to s. 91(24) Indians. All such
provisions assume that provinces have the power to determine what impact their own
legislation will have on matters integral to exclusive federal authority.
This issue arose specifically in Natural Parents, supra note 35, in respect of s. 10(4a) of
the B.C. Adoption Act, which said that s. 10's provisions did not affect "[t]he status, rights,
privileges, disabilities, and limitations of an adopted Indian person acquired as an Indian under
the Indian Act (Canada) or under any other Act or law": see ibid. at 757. According to Beetz
J., who wrote (at 787) for himself and for two other judges, s. 10(4a) was
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It is important here to be careful not to overestimate the extent of
provincial incapacity. Everyone agrees that provincial measures can be
valid despite having quite a substantial impact on s. 35 rights, on s. 91(24)
Indians, or on lands reserved and the interests in them. As long as the
primary focus of a measure or provision is really on matters legitimately
within provincial capacity, the provision will be valid no matter how
substantial its impact on s. 91(24) lands or Indians. 9t The task for the
courts in such situations is to determine whether the measure, despite its
effects on Indians, s. 35 rights or lands reserved, is a genuine use of
powers conferred upon the provinces, or whether those effects give them
sufficient reason to conclude that the measure displays an intention to
exercise exclusively federal powers. Even when the provincial measure
turns out to be valid, however, the courts must consider what application,
if any, it has to core federal matters such as s. 35 rights.
clearly ultra vires. This may be paradoxical since s. (4a) appears to have been dictated
by the intent not to invade federal jurisdiction. But what was said is what matters, not
what was meant. Whether 'the status, rights, privileges, disabilities and limitations of
an adopted Indian person acquired as an Indian under the Indian Act' are affected or not
affected by adoption is, as a matter of legislative policy, exclusively for Parliament to
decide, or, as a question of interpretation in a proper case, for the courts to rule upon.
How Indian status is affected, by adoption or otherwise, is a matter coming within the
class of subjects mentioned in s. 91.24 of the British North America Act, 1867.
The other six judges agreed that s. 10(4a) was invalid--or, at a minimum, "constitutionally
suspect" -to the extent that it purported to bring about any change in the law: ibid. at 764,
Laskin C.J.C.; at 775, Martland J.; at 777, Ritchie J. Compare R. v. Sutherland, [ 1980] 2 S.C.R.
451 at 456-457 ("A provincial legislature may not pass laws to determine the scope of the
protection afforded to [Indian hunting rights] by the [Manitoba] Natural Resources Transfer
Agreement. If the laws have the effect of altering the agreement, they are constitutionally
invalid; if not, they are mere surplusage.")
Len Rotman, who agrees in a recent article that "[t]his type of activity ... primafacie
amounts to legislation in respect to Indians qua Indians" and that "[p]ior to the existence of
the Constitution Act, 1982, there is little doubt that such provincial activity would have been
declared ultra vires, and thereby rendered void," suggests nonetheless that "a province may
[now] exempt Aboriginal peoples from certain provincial laws or regulations" because of
ss. 35(l) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982: see L. I. Rotman, "Provincial Fiduciary
Obligations to First Nations: The Nexus Between Government Power and Responsibility"
(1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 735 at 782. This can be true, it seems to me, only if we understand
ss. 35(l) and 52(l ) as conferring on provinces powers in respect of "core" federal matters that
they did not have before 1982. 1 know of no basis in law for that supposition: see infra notes
158-163 and the accompanying text.
My own view is that such provisions are unnecessary, because the provinces have no
power of their own to regulate, even through more general measures, matters at the core of
federal authority under s. 91(24). See especially infra notes 99-110 and the accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Kruger & Manuel, supra note 73 at 11; Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note
19 at 344.
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b. The Question of Application: Interjurisdictional Immunity
As the preceding discussion shows, provinces may not make it their
business to regulate or make provision for s. 35 rights or for other matters
in classes of subjects reserved exclusively to federal authority. When they
make such matters the primary focus of their initiatives, those initiatives
are wholly without legal effect. Sometimes, however, valid provincial
measures-measures whose primary concern is not with matters within
the core of exclusive federal authority-have the effect of regulating,
determining or disposing of matters "which form an integral part of the
exclusive federal jurisdiction over [some] thing orperson," 99 even though
such effects may not be "the very result contemplated by the Legislature
and pursued by it as a matter of policy."''0° Such measures, though valid
and enforceable throughout the rest of their range, have no enforceable
application to persons, places or things-such as s. 91(24) lands, or s. 35
rights-shielded within the core of the enumerated heads of federal
authority. '0' This result is sometimes called "constitutional inapplicability"
or the doctrine of "interjurisdictional immunity."
Restrictions on the application of otherwise valid provincial measures
follow necessarily from the fact that federal authority over certain matters
is exclusive and remains so whether or not the federal government
chooses ever to use it. 10 2 Subjects within exclusive federal authority,
again, are subtracted from the powers conferred on the provinces. 0 3 For
this reason, it makes no difference, at least for some purposes, whether a
province sets out to exercise powers or deal with matters reserved
exclusively to the federal order. Whatever its intention may be, it simply
cannot deal with such matters, and provincial measures that do so can
have, to that extent, no legal effect. Provincial activity cannot have
99. Canada (National Battlefields Commission) v. Quibec (C.T.C.U.Q.), [1990] 2 S.C.R.
838 at 853 [hereinafter National Battlefields Commission].
100. See Dick 85, supra note 73 at 322.
101. Ibid. at 325-326; Bell 88, supra note 33 at 826; Ordon Estate, supra note 33 at 62-63,
65. For this purpose, one need not prove that the relevant measure impairs the legal status or
capacities--e.g., the s. 35 rights--of s. 91(24) Indians, or that it has an equivalent impact on
s. 91(24) lands. No mandatory provincial measure can govern "core" matters, whether or not
it happens to meet the more stringent "impairment" test: see Bell 88, ibid. at 855-856, 857,860;
compare Bankes, supra note 18 at 318-319, 333, 337-338. Provincial measures, however,
whose application would impair, even indirectly, the legal status of s. 35 rights (or any other
exclusively federal matter or subject) will be denied that legal effect, even if such measures do
not purport to apply directly to them: see Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
at 954-959; Manitoba (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), 11929] A.C. 260 (P.C.). Thanks to Lisa
DeMarco for calling this latter point to my attention.
102. Supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; National Battlefields Commission, supra
note 99 at 853.
103. Supra notes 24-30, 93-96 and the accompanying text.
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enforceable legal consequences that a province is not entitled or empow-
ered to intend.'" "[Jiust as the legislature cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, it cannot by using general words effect a result which
would be beyond its powers if brought about by precise words." 105
Seen in this context, the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity gives
courts a way of preserving as much as possible of a provincial measure
despite the fact that the measure, if given full scope, would regulate or
dispose of matters that lie beyond the reach of provincial au-u..ity. It
reflects our law's underlying assumption that the dominant intention of
each of our legislative bodies is "to confine itself to its own sphere and
... that general words in a statute are not intended to extend its operation
beyond the territorial [or, one must assume, the substantive] authority of
the Legislature." 0 6 Confronted with a measure that would make mandatory
provision for some matters that lie outside, as well as some within, the
enacting body's authority, the courts will as a general rule "read down"
the measure to confine its application exclusively to permissible matters.'07
The difference, therefore, between a provincial measure that is invalid
on account of s. 91(24) and one that is merely inapplicable to s. 91(24)
104. See, supra e.g., Madden v. Fort Sheppard Railway, [1899] A.C. 626 (P.C.) at 628.
105. McKay v. The Queen, [1965] S.C.R. 798 at 806. See also Natural Parents, supra note
35 at 761, Laskin C.J.C. (for the plurality) ("Nothing... accretes to provincial legislative power
by the generalization of the language of provincial legislation if it does not constitutionally
belong there"), quoted with approval in Bell 88, supra note 33 at 835.
106. Reference re Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. 198 at 255.
107. When otherwise valid provincial legislation, given the generality of its terms,
extends beyond the matter over which the legislature had jurisdiction and over a
matter of federal exclusive jurisdiction, it must, in order to preserve its
constitutionality, be read down and given the limited meaning which will confine
it within the limits of the provincial jurisdiction:
Derrickson, supra note 62 at 296 (matrimonial property legislation not applicable on reserve).
See also Ordon Estate, supra note 33 at 65; C.B.C. v. Quebec Police Commission, [1979]
2 S.C.R. 618 at 641; Duplain v. Cameron, [ 1961 ] S.C.R. 693 at 709; Hogg, Constitutional Law,
supra note 19 at 359-361.
In principle, this is no less true of federal than of provincial legislation. Because,
however, the federal powers enumerated in s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 are, as a rule,
powers subtracted from provincial authority, it is much more unusual to find, and much more
difficult to imagine, circumstances in which federal legislation is, or ought to be, read down
to accommodate a core of provincial authority. One case where this seems to have happened
is C.N.R. v. Clark, [ 1988] 2 S.C.R. 680 (RailwayAct limitation period read down so as to govern
statutory causes of action only, not actions brought against railways under the common law).
It is a little more common to see federal legislation read down when that legislation is based
on authority elsewhere in the constitution, e.g., s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867(establishment
of courts for the better administration of the laws of Canada). For some examples and further
discussion, see B. Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian
Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" (1991) 36 McGill L.J.
308 at 357-358 esp. n. 213.
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Indians or to Indian lands is that, in the former instance, the measure's
design and mandatory impacts invite the conclusion, despite the standard
presumption of constitutional behaviour,10 8 that its primary focus is on
exclusively federal matters: in the latter instance, they do not. The invalid
measure is invalid because it is really "in relation to" Indians or Indian
lands; the other one is not invalid because it is not so aimed. °9 The
practical difference this distinction makes, surprisingly enough, is almost
exclusively" 0 to determine what enforceable impact, if any, the measure
can have on matters unrelated to s. 35 rights, or more generally, to
s. 91(24) lands or Indians. Neither kind of measure, as such, can govern
any of those.
108. See, e.g., Kruger & Manuel, supra note 73, at 112 ("The presumption is for the validity
of a legislative enactment..."); compare Nowegijick v. The Queen, [ 1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36
[hereinafter Nowegijick].
109. Consider in this context the following well-known and influential passage from
Martland J.'s majority judgment in Cardinal, supra note 73 at 703:
In my opinion, the test as to the application of Provincial legislation within a Reserve
is the same as with respect to its application within the Province and that is that it must
be within the authority of s. 92 and must not be in relation to a subject matter assigned
exclusively to the Canadian Parliament under s. 91. Two of those subjects are Indians
and Indian Reserves, but if Provincial legislation within the limits of s. 92 is not
construed as being legislation in relation to those classes of subjects (or any other
subject under s. 91), it is applicable anywhere in the Province, including Indian
Reserves, even though Indians or Indian Reserves might be affected by it [emphasis
added].
Although the Supreme Court itself has cited this passage with approval (see, e.g., Construction
Montcalm v. Quebec (Minimum Wage Commission), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 754 at 778), and some
lower courts have used it as a touchstone in determining whether certain provincial laws could
apply to Indians or on reserve (see, e.g., Re Park Mobile Home Sales Ltd. and Le Greely (1978),
85 D.L.R. (3d) 618 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Park Mobile]. Sarcee, supra note 59 at 436,
Morrow J.A.; R. v. Twoyoungmen (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 598 (Alta. C.A.) at 601; Rempel
Brothers, Concrete Ltd. v. Chilliwack (1994), 88 B.C.L.R. (2d) 209 (C.A.)), in my view it errs
by confusing and conflating the question of validity with the question of application. Taken full
strength, it would mean that all valid provincial legislation applies to Indians and (at least) to
reserve lands; only legislation "in relation to" one or the other-and therefore, by usual
reckonings, invalid-would fail to apply. In subsequent decisions, however, the Supreme
Court has affirmed, repeatedly and unanimously, that provincial laws can fail, despite their
validity, to govern Indians or lands reserved for the Indians: see Derrickson, supra note 62 at
296, quoted supra note 107; Paul v. Paul, [ 1986] 1 S.C.R. 306; Dick 85, supra note 73 at 321 -
322, 325-327; Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1121-1122. For somewhat similar criticisms of
Cardinal, ibid., see Bankes, supra note 18 at 338-343.
110. Another important difference, as we'll see in more detail below, arises in respect of
s. 88 of the Indian Act. Section 88 incorporates by reference, as federal law, certain provincial
measures that on their own are constitutionally inapplicable to Indians. It does not and cannot,
however, give federal effect to invalid provincial measures, because the determination of
invalidity leaves nothing behind to incorporate. See infra notes 182-183 and the accompanying
text.
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3. Summary
The aim of this lengthy review has been to clarify the relationship-as it
exists before and apart from s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982-between
provincial authority and the rights that s. 35 protects. From it emerge two
key propositions. The first is that s. 35 rights are, by their very nature,
matters integral to the federal order's exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians,
and Lands reserved for the Indians." The second is that the provinces
therefore have no authority of their own to govern, define or dispose of
such rights through mandatory measures. The second of these two
propositions is a logically necessary consequence of the first, given the
structure of the Canadian constitutional order as articulated and construed
for over a century by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada.
If this is so, it means that resort to s. 35's justification procedure is not an
option in respect of provincial measures that interfere with the use of
s. 35 rights, because the rest of the constitution precludes them from
having any such effect.
This, in my view, is the general state of things. There are, however, a
few possible exceptions:
1) Aboriginal peoples other than s. 91(24) Indians
The reason why provinces, generally speaking, have no power to interfere
with the use of s. 35 rights is because such rights are integral to the federal
order's exclusive authority over s. 91(24) Indians and lands. The federal
order, however, does not have exclusive constitutional authority, as a
general rule, over peoples or individuals who are not s. 91(24) Indians. If
any such peoples prove nonetheless to have s. 35 rights, it is at a minimum
arguable that provincial measures, generally speaking, would govern
their exercise of such rights."'I If, for example, M6tis turn out, as such, to
have aboriginal rights" 2 despite not being s. 91(24) Indians," 3 it is
reasonable to suppose that the provinces will be able to regulate the
exercise of such rights, subject to the justification requirements built
into s. 35.
111. But see Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 11 19: "The core of Indianness encompasses the
whole range of aboriginal rights that are protected by s. 35(1)" (emphasis added).
112. For recent authority to this effect, see R. v. Powley, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 (Ont. Prov.
Div.).
113. For recent authority to this effect, see R. v. Blais, [ 199814 C.N.L.R. 103 (Man. Q.B.) at
113-114; R. v. Grumbo (1998), 159 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Sask. C.A.) at 605-606, Wakeling J.A.
(dissenting) (the majority did not address this specific issue).
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2) Special constitutional authority
The usual limitations on provincial powers cease to govern when the
constitution itself expressly confers special powers on certain provinces.
One potential source of such powers is the Constitution Act, 1930, which
gives the force of law, "notwithstanding anything in the Constitution Act,
1867, or any Act amending the same, .... ." to the Natural Resources
Transfer Agreements (NRTAs) signed in that year with the three Prairie
provinces. "5 According to those agreements, Indians within the boundaries
of those provinces are now in some respects subject to "the laws
respecting game in force [there] from time to time."" 16 There is some room
for controversy about what impact this arrangement has on provincial
jurisdiction; at times, the Supreme Court of Canada has said that it "does
not expand provincial authority but contracts it.""' 7 It seems clear from
the Badger decision, however, that it does give Prairie provinces some
specific authority to regulate, through game legislation, some activities
protected by treaty right," 18 and that such regulation will stand in need of
justification, in accordance with Sparrow, when it constrains such
rights. ' 9
114. Constitution Act, 1930, s. 1.
115. For some background, see supra note 58. The Constitution Act, 1930 also gives effect
to Canada's NRTA with British Columbia, but that agreement is irrelevant for present
purposes.
116. See s. 12 of the Alberta and Saskatchewan NRTAs; s. 13 of the Manitoba NRTA.
According to this same provision, however, the Indians "shall have the right, which the
Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all
seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said
Indians may have a right of access."
117. See, e.g., R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 934 [hereinafter Horseman] citing
Cardinal, supra note 73 at 722, Laskin C.J.C. (dissenting).
118. See Badger, supra note 6 at 820 ("The effect of para. 12 of the [Alberta] NRTA is to place
the Provincial government in exactly the same position which the Federal Crown formerly
occupied"); 809-810. See also Sundown, supra note 6 at 413; Horseman, ibid. at 935-936. In
principle, these powers would also reach any aboriginal (as well as treaty) rights of hunting,
fishing or trapping in those provinces; all such rights within those provinces, however, happen
already to be protected by treaties. For further discussion, see McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction,"
supra note 18 at 450-453.
119. See Badger, ibid. at 811-816; 820-822; Sundown, ibid. at 413, 417. As Kent McNeil
points out, however,
it had never been suggested by the Court prior to Badger that provincial infringements
of the rights that are constitutionally guaranteed by [this provision in the NRTAs] could
be justified.... The irony of Badger is that constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal
and treaty rights by s. 35(1) . . . has actually resulted in a reduction of the protection
accorded to Indian hunting, trapping, and fishing rights by para. 12 of the [Alberta]
NRTA:
McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," ibid. at 451 n. 95. Emphasis in original.
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3) Treaty provisions incorporating provincial regulatory measures
Another exception arises where a treaty itself makes allowance for the
operation of provincial law. Many of the numbered treaties made since
Confederation, for instance, specify that the hunting and fishing rights
they preserve or confer are to be subject "to such regulations as may from
time to time be made by the Government of the country." 2' The Supreme
Court has said that the "Government of the country" clause in Treaty 8
contemplates the application of provincial, as well as federal, game
conservation laws to the treaty Indians.'2 Where this is so, the relevant
provincial legislation operates not as an external constraint on the use of
the treaty right, but as an internal limit on the right's protected scope,
incorporated by reference into the treaty itself. 22 The treaty, in other
words, defines the right in a way that leaves room for the provincial
measure's application. For that reason, other things being equal, the
120. See, e.g., the text of Treaties 4 and 7 as set out in A. Morris, The Treaties of Canada with
the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke, 1880) at
333, 369 respectively. Treaties 3, 5 and 6 use the phrase "her Government of her Dominion of
Canada" in place of "the Government of the country": see ibid. at 323, 346, 353, respectively.
121. See Badger, supra note 6 at 809-810. Compare Sundown, supra note 6 at 413 (Treaty
6). This is so, the court says, because
[i]n the West, a wide range of legislation aimed at conserving game had been enacted
by the government beginning as early as the 1880s. Acts and regulations pertaining to
conservation measures continued to be passed throughout the entire period during
which the numbered treaties were concluded.... [citing examples] ... In light of these
conservation laws prior to signing the Treaty, the Indians would have understood that,
by the terms of the Treaty, the government would be permitted to pass regulations with
respect to conservation .... It follows that by the terms of both the Treaty and [s. 12 of]
the [Alberta] NRTA, provincial game laws would be applicable to Indians so long as
they were aimed at conserving the supply of game:
Badger, ibid. There is at least one obvious problem with this line of argument. Treaty 8, as the
court acknowledges (ibid. at 790), was made, and presumably came into force, on June 21,
1899; the province of Alberta, where most of the territory surrendered in Treaty 8 is located,
and where the relevant activity in Badger took place, did not even come into existence until
1905: see Alberta Act, 4 & 5 Edw. VII, c. 3. (This surely accounts for the awkward fact that all
the examples the court provided (in text omitted from the quotation above) of conservation
legislation contemporaneous with the treaty are federal laws.) I struggle to understand how one
can comfortably assume that the Indians signing Treaty 8 would have understood and expected
that the harvesting rights they secured in the treaty would be routinely subject to laws enacted
by a separate order of government that was not yet even in place at the time they made the treaty.
122. This may well be true too where Canada delegates to a province authority it acquired or
retained pursuant to treaty. See, e.g., s. I of the federal-provincial agreement to deal with certain
Treaty 3 matters (attached as the schedule to the statutory agreement statutes, supra note 85).
It provided expressly for Ontario to have the power, reserved in Treaty 3 to "her Government
of her Dominion of Canada," to take up lands for settlement and other purposes, and thereby
to reduce the range of lands available underTreaty 3 for unregulated Indian hunting and fishing.
Such an arrangement today, of course, would itself require justification in accordance with
s. 35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
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provincial measure will apply to the relevant conduct pursuant to the
treaty because it does not purport to be exercising powers of derogation
that are exclusive to the federal order. In Badger, the Supreme Court
suggests that the provincial measure ought in these circumstances to be
subject to justification. 23
4) Affirmative treaty promises
There are two kinds of treaty rights: rights that protect certain kinds of
aboriginal activity, such as subsistence hunting and fishing, from
interference by legislatures or governments, and rights to enforce
affirmative promises that the Crown has made-to make annual payments,
for instance, or set aside lands and create reserves-to the aboriginal
signatories. Where a province itself participates and makes affirmative
promises (of money or land, say) in a treaty involving federal and
aboriginal parties, it will, of course, have an obligation to keep its own
promises 2 4 and, at a minimum, to justify, in accordance with s. 35, any
failure to do so. It is possible that the same will now be true in situations
where the federal government makes promises in a treaty that it cannot,
for constitutional reasons, fulfill unilaterally. In Treaty 3, for example,
Canada was unable to keep its promise to create reserves for the Saulteaux
Ojibway after they surrendered the aboriginal interest in their lands,
because, upon the surrender, those lands belonged absolutely to Ontario:
Canada no longer had authority to manage their disposition.125 In the
unlikely event that such a circumstance arose again, 126 the province might
123. Badger, supra note 6 at 811-816, 820-822. This conclusion too may deserve some
further thought. If these treaties indeed provide that certain rights are to be defined in relation
to the law of the province from time to time, then (by definition) provincial law cannot infringe
such rights, because conduct in breach of provincial law cannot come within the protected
scope of these rights. In circumstances such as these, where infringement itself is impossible,
the task of justification is irrelevant.
The effect of this argument is, of course, to render any treaty rights governed by
"Government of the country" clauses almost entirely subject to the whims of mainstream
governments, both federal and provincial. That result is sufficiently disadvantageous to the
aboriginal parties to these treaties to make one doubt the possibility that they gave it their free
and informed consent. There is, however, no other obvious way of using these clauses to
subordinate treaty rights to provincial law. And if, despite everything, this arrangement really
is the one the treating parties intended to implement, then it seems more appropriate to enforce
it than to use the extremely general language of s. 35 as a pretext for altering it.
124. Assuming, of course, that it had the constitutional authority to carry out the promises it
had made.
125. See, e.g,. St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 50; Seybold, supra note 38, and, for
discussion, supra note 38.
126. The federal government has now made reciprocal arrangements with most, if not all, the
provinces (I have no information about Quebec) to avoid this contingency. See supra note 58.
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be called upon, pursuant to s. 35, to justify any failure to cooperate in
setting aside the reserves. 27
Even at their broadest and strongest, these exceptions are extremely
narrow and specialized; they focus exclusively on specific aboriginal
peoples, specific provinces and kinds of activity, and specific treaties and
those subject to them. Even considered as a group, they do not defeat or
dilute the conclusion that the provinces, generally speaking, can have no
recourse to justification in respect of s. 35 rights.' 28 Ordinary division of
powers principles, as we have seen, will almost always neutralize, before
and apart from the operation of s. 35 itself, any restrictive regulatory
impacts provincial measures might have had on such rights. 29
Or so one would have been entitled to think, at least until recently. As
mentioned earlier, 30 the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw, and perhaps
also in Cbtj, appears to have suggested otherwise. It is now time to review
these suggestions and to decide how much weight one ought to give them.
III. Arguments for Provincial Capacity
1. Independent Capacity: Delgamuukw, Cbti and Badger
In Cbt,6, again, the Supreme Court declared, quite sensibly, that provincial
measures infringing s. 35 rights are subject to the same standards of
justification-those first set out in Sparrow"3'-that govern federal
measures.'32 The Cbtg decision, however, stops short of saying that
provinces, generally speaking, may infringe s. 35 rights.'3 3 It was only
later, in Delgamuukw, that the Court took that further step. While
explicating for the first time the test of justification for infringements of
aboriginal title, the Court observed, as if in passing, that the "aboriginal
rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including aboriginal title,
127. But see, e.g., Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1910] A.C. 637 (P.C.), esp. at 644-646
(despite receiving windfall under Treaty 3, Ontario not legally responsible for fulfilling treaty
obligations Canada undertook, for its own reasons, unilaterally); Mitchell v. Peguis Indian
Band, [ 1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 143 [hereinafter Mitchell] ("provincial Crownsbearno responsibility
to provide for the welfare and protection of native peoples").
128. See, e.g., Badger, supra note 6 at 809.
129. For similar conclusions, see Bankes, supra note 18 at 318-320.
130. See supra notes 9, 21-22 and the accompanying text.
131. See supra note 2. See generally supra notes 2-6 and the accompanying text.
132. See quotation accompanying supra note 15 and generally, supra notes 14-17 and the
accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 17-19 and the accompanying text.
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... may be infringed, both by the federal (e.g., Sparrow) and provincial
(e.g., Cbtg) governments."'3 4
To date, this is all the Supreme Court has said about general provincial
capacity to infringe s. 35 rights; it has offered neither elaboration nor
argument in support of this assertion. Even so, there is some reason to
suppose that the Court meant what it said; all the objectives the
Delgamuukw Court identified as compelling enough to anchorjustification
of aboriginal title infringements-"the development of agriculture,
forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic
development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the
settlement of foreign populations to support those aims" 13 -involve
objectives that typically come within provincial authority. 3 6
What are we to make of this? If the provinces now have the power
routinely to constrain the use of treaty and aboriginal rights, subject only
to the justification requirements the court derived from s. 35(1), where
and how did they get that authority? 33
This is not a question the Supreme Court itself had to address, either
in Ctet or in Delgamuukw. In Cbtj, the Court concluded that the relevant
provincial measure did not constrain materially the exercise of the
relevant aboriginal or treaty rights; 3 ' in Delgamuukw, the appeal did not
concern specific provincial legislation or activity and the Court made no
finding on the merits of the claim of aboriginal title. 39 Perhaps this is why
the Court's account of provincial infringement powers is so cursory. As
a result, we can only guess what the Court itself might say in response to
it. Our only option, for now at least, is to see what sense we can make of
what the Court has said.
When the Court concluded in Delgamuukw that provincial governments
may interfere with the use of aboriginal rights, it relied---exclusively and
134. Delgamuukw, supra note4 at 1107. "However," thecourt adds ibid., "s. 35(1) requires
that those infringements satisfy the test of justification."
135. lbid. atlIll.
136. Kent McNeil, to the best of my knowledge, was the first to recognize this in print. See
McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," supra note 18 at 454. See also Delgamuukw, ibid. at 1113,
discussed supra note 60.
137. This question figures prominently in Kent McNeil's recent work on these issues. See
McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," ibid. at 448-453; K. McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in
the 90's: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got It Right?, (North York: Robarts Centre for
Canadian Studies, York University, 1998) at 26-27 [hereinafter McNeil, Defining Aboriginal
Title].
138. See Citd, supra note 9 at 163-164, 187-189, 192-193.
139. See Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1063, 1079, 1123.
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without further comment-on its earlier decision in Cbt .14° Again,
though, the C~t decision does not say how-or, strictly speaking, even
whether-provincial measures are able to infringe s. 35 rights; all it says
is that Sparrow standards apply if and when such measures manage to do
so. The Supreme Court anchors that conclusion exclusively, and without
explanation or further comment, on the earlier Badger decision's
"application of Sparrow test to provincial statute which violated a treaty
right." 1
41
And indeed, Badger does apply the Sparrow test to a provincial statute
that violated a treaty right. 42 As the Court itself took pains to emphasize,
however, Badger is a highly unusual case. The Supreme Court's description
of the provinces' usual predicament is virtually identical to the conclusions
set out above on provincial capacity:
Pursuant to the provisions of s. 88 of the Indian Act, provincial laws of
general application will apply to Indians. This is so except where they
conflict with aboriginal or treaty rights, in which case the latter must
prevail: [citing authority]. In any event, the regulation of Indian hunting
rights would ordinarily come within the jurisdiction of the Federal
government and not the Province.43
What makes the provincial measure at issue in Badger an exception to this
general proposition, the Court said, is the combined operation of the
"Government of the country" clause included in Treaty 8144 and paragraph
12 of the Alberta NRTA: 145 two of the four specific exceptions to the usual
rules on division of powers. "Both the Treaty and the NRTA," the Court
concluded, "specifically provided that the [treaty] right would be subject
to [provincial] regulation pertaining to conservation."' 4 6 Because these
two extraordinary provisions were in play, it was "unnecessary" for the
Court "to consider s. 88 of the Indian Act and the general application of
140. See supra note 134 and the accompanying text. The reference to the C& decision (supra
note 9) is nowhere more specific than this, but almost certainly has in mind the passage (ibid.
at 185) quoted in the text supra note 15. This is Kent McNeil's view, as well: see McNeil,
"Rethinking Jurisdiction," supra note 18 at 448-450.
141. CObt, ibid. at 185, quoted supra note 15 in accompanying text.
142. See Badger, supra note 6 at 809-816.
143. Ibid. at 809. Emphasis added.
144. See supra notes 120-123 and the accompanying text.
145. Paragraph 12, and its counterpart provisions in the NRTAs with Saskatchewan (s.12)
and Manitoba (s.13), confers on these provinces special constitutional authority, despite
anything in the Constitution Act, 1867, to regulate, through game legislation, Indian hunting
and fishing. See supra notes 114-119 and the accompanying text.
146. Badger, supra note 6 at 809. See also, more recently, Sundown, supra note 6 at 24, where
the court reaffirmed this conclusion.
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provincial regulations to Indians"; 4 7 that general issue "does not arise in
this case."' 48
By its own description, therefore, the Badger decision establishes
provincial capacity to interfere with the use of s. 35 rights only pursuant
to a "Government of the country" clause or an NRTA, and only in the
limited circumstances to which those instruments pertain. It cannot be
considered authority for the conclusion that provinces, generally speaking,
may infringe s. 35 rights. 4 9 If anything, it strongly suggests the contrary.
If we want to find a doctrinal foundation for the suggestion in Delgamuukw
that s. 35 rights, as such, are open to provincial infringement, we are going
to have to look elsewhere for it. There are three possible ways of seeking
to integrate that proposition into existing constitutional law.
First, one might suppose that the Supreme Court intended by this
suggestion to invite reconsideration of the whole notion of
interjurisdictional immunity. The principal reason, as noted above, for
concluding that provinces, generally speaking, have no power of their
own to regulate the scope or exercise of s. 35 rights is that such rights
come within the defining core of authority reserved exclusively to the
federal order of government by s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
If the courts were now to conclude that core federal matters were no
longer exclusive-were, from a provincial standpoint, open for business,
so to speak-then provincial measures could constrain the exercise of
such rights, as long as they did not interfere with the operation of federal
law and as long as the province could justify, as s. 35 requires, the specific
constraints it imposed.
For better or worse, this approach is almost certainly no longer
available. The principle of interjurisdictional immunity is not a peculiarity
unique to federal authority over Indian lands and s. 91(24) Indians;5 0 it
is a pervasive and fundamental feature of the architecture of Canadian
federalism,'I' as even some of its harshest critics now, albeit reluctantly
147. Ibid. at 810.
148. Ibid. at 809.
149. Compare McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," supra note 18 at 448-453, which reaches
the same conclusion.
150. But see Ryder, supra note 107 who comes very close to arguing (e.g., at 362-364) that
it should be.
151. See supra notes 99-110 and the accompanying text.
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acknowledge.'52 In 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada considered in
detail the criticisms advanced against the principle, and reaffirmed it
unanimously.'53 Given this history, it would be difficult even in optimal
circumstances to sustain the supposition that the Court intended these
unnecessary and almost casual observations in Delgamuukw to undermine
such firmly established doctrine.
The decisive impediment to it, however, is the fact that Delgamuukw
itself is firm authority in support of the principle of interjurisdictional
immunity. It was in Delgamuukw that the Supreme Court determined
conclusively that aboriginal rights are among the matters at the core of
exclusive federal authority;'54 in that same decision, the Court affirmed
that "s. 91(24) protects a core of federal jurisdiction even from provincial
laws of general application, through the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity."'55 Not only is this the proposition on which the Supreme
Court based its conclusion that the provinces have no power, even
through valid general measures, to extinguish aboriginal rights; 5 6 it is the
precedent that the Court has derived from Delgamuukw in its subsequent
jurisprudence on interjurisdictional immunity.'57
A second possibility is that the Constitution Act, 1982, and perhaps
s. 35(1) itself, somehow equipped the provinces with additional authority-
new jurisdiction beyond that conferred in the initial division of powers-
to regulate the exercise of existing aboriginal and treaty rights. As the
Badger decision makes clear, this sort of thing has happened before; the
152. I have been persuaded by Beetz J. [in Bell 88, supra note 33] and Professor Elliot
that some degree of interjurisdictional immunity is entailed by the Constitution of
Canada's dual lists of exclusive powers. Otherwise, what would be incompetent to
a legislative body in a narrowly framed law would be permitted if the law were
framed more broadly. That cannot be right. However, I still think that the vital part
test casts the immunity too widely. The old sterilization or impairment test would
be more appropriate in my view:
Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 19 at 364 n. 129.
153. See Bell 88, supra note 33 esp. at 837-845.
154. Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1119.
155. Ibid. at 1121.
156. Ibid. at 1121, 1134, and generally at 1115-1123.
157. The principle that each head of federal power possesses an essential core which the
provinces are not permitted to regulate indirectly was recently restated by Lamer
C.J. in Delgamuukw, supra, at para. 181, in the context of the federal power over
Indians and lands reserved for Indians. Speaking for the majority of the Court, Lamer
C.J. stated that s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, protects a 'core of federal
jurisdiction' over Indians and lands reserved for Indians even from provincial laws
of general application, through the operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity:
Ordon Estate, supra note 33 at 497-498 (provincial law generally inapplicable to matters
arising from maritime negligence law).
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Constitution Act, 1930, which gave effect to the NRTAs, gave the Prairie
provinces some special powers to regulate through game legislation
certain aspects of Indian hunting, fishing and trapping activity, whether
or not such activity is protected by s. 35 rights. 158 If the 1982 amendments
have a similar-only more general-impact on provincial authority, we
would have a basis on which to conclude that the provinces now have the
power to engage in justified regulation of s. 35 rights.
The fatal objection to this suggestion is that it has no foundation. To
begin with, s. 35(l) itself says nothing about expanding the authority of
the provinces; it recognizes and affirms existing treaty and aboriginal
rights. In the course of determining what protection this new provision
was to give to such rights, the Supreme Court in Sparrow insisted that the
words of s. 35(1) be given a "generous, liberal interpretation" and agreed
that any "doubtful expressions" within it should be "resolved in favour of
the Indians."'' 59 It would be utterly inconsistent with these instructions to
suppose, in the absence of much clearer language, that s. 35(1) leaves
such rights with less protection from provincial interference than they
would have had if it had not been enacted at all."6
In fact, the Constitution Act, 1982 did confer some new authority on
Canada's provinces. Sections 50 and 51 gave effect to the provisions we
now call s. 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867. These provisions exist to
clarify and expand provincial authority over the marketing and
development of certain energy forms and natural resources. They
demonstrate how those responsible for the 1982 amendments proceeded
when their purpose was to increase the constitutional authority of the
provinces or otherwise to alter the pre-existing division of powers: by
making those new powers explicit and by situating them in Part VI of the
document ("Amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867"), so there could
be no confusion about the impact they were to have. The contrast between
these provisions and s. 35, which appears in Part II ("Rights of the
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada"), could not be more clear. And unlike the
1930 amendments, 6' sections 50 and 51 confer no special powers to
regulate Indian activity, and they operate within the framework of the
158. See supra notes 114-119, 142-148 and the accompanying text.
159. See Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1106-1107, applying Nowegijick, supra note 108 at 36 and
R. v. Agawa (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 266 (Ont. C.A.) at 284-285.
160. But see Kent McNeil's observation, quoted atsupra note 119, that s. 35(l), as interpreted
and applied in Badger, supra note 6, appears to have made the harvesting rights protected in
the NRTAs more vulnerable to provincial interference than they were before.
16 1. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text for quotations of, and citations to, the
relevant text.
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division of powers-subject, that is, to interjurisdictional immunity-
not outside it.
Finally, Badger itself, as we saw, describes the 1930 amendments as
exceptions from the constitution's general rules: rules that assign to the
federal order the power to regulate Indian hunting and that subordinate
provincial laws to s. 35 rights.'62 These are conclusions the Court could
not have reached if it had understood the 1982 amendments to have given
the provinces general authority to limit the use of such rights. Had that
been the situation, the Court would have no occasion even to consider, for
this purpose at least, 63 the impact of the 1930 amendments.
The final possible source of provincial authority to restrict the use of
s. 35 rights is s. 88 of the Indian Act. If there is doctrinal foundation for
the Supreme Court's recent intimations, in Crte and Delgamuukw, that
the provinces routinely have such authority, it appears that s. 88 is where
we shall have to find it.
The next section considers s. 88 in detail. Notice first, though, that any
such scheme that depends on s. 88 is itself an acknowledgement that
provincial measures as such have no weight to constrain s. 91(24) Indians'
use of s. 35 rights. 164 It is, as described in more detail below, 65 as federal-
not provincial-law that provincial measures govern pursuant to s. 88. As a
result, s. 88, even at its strongest and most facilitative, cannot equip provincial
governments, acting as such, to constrain the use of s. 35 rights; at most, it
can empower them to do so on behalf of the federal government. (Even that
capacity, of course, is subject to the pleasure of Parliament.) Whatever the
outcome of the s. 88 inquiry, therefore, it will almost certainly be incorrect,
strictly speaking, to say that provincial governments themselves have the
power routinely to infringe the s. 35 rights of s. 91(24) Indians."6
162. See supra notes 142-148 and the accompanying text.
163. Even then, however, the Indians subject to the agreements adopted by the 1930
amendments would be entitled to the special protection those agreements themselves afford to
Indian hunting, fishing and trapping for food "at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied
Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians may have a right of access" (see
supra note 116 and accompanying text), because those protections continue to operate despite
any Act amending the Constitution Act, 1867. See supra note 114. To-that extent, the 1930
amendments could still affect results in Indian hunting and fishing cases in the Prairie
provinces, even on the hypothesis suggested in the text.
164. One confirmation of this is the fact that s. 88 applies exclusively to provincial laws
"which cannot apply to Indians without regulating them qua Indians": see, e.g., Dick 85, supra
note 73 at 326-328; infra notes 168-173 and the accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 168-173 and the accompanying text.
166. Compare McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title, supra note 137 at 27 ("1 think the Court will
be obliged to accept the consequences of its decision that Parliament has exclusivej urisdiction
over Aboriginal title. This means that, to the extent that infringements of Aboriginal title can
be justified ... the power to do so is exclusively federal"). See also McNeil, "Rethinking
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2. Delegated Federal Authority: Section 88 of the Indian Act
a. How Section 88 Operates
The argument so far demonstrates that Canada's provinces have no
independent capacity-except where the constitution or a treaty has
specifically said otherwise' 67 -to interfere with the use by s. 91(24)
Indians of their existing aboriginal or treaty rights. This means that such
Indians' s. 35 rights will always take precedence-leaving aside these
exceptional circumstances of special authorization-over provincial
measures purporting to constrain their exercise. Despite the justification
procedure embedded in s. 35, the provinces have no occasion to justify
any such constraints because on their own they lack the constitutional
authority to impose them.
Our question now is whether, and if so in what circumstances, s. 88 of
the Indian Act intercedes to create any such occasion. The text of s. 88
reads:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws
of general application from time to time in force in any province are
applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent
that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation
or by-law made thereunder, and except to the extent that those laws make
provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.
After years of struggle and (frankly quite understandable) confusion, 161
the Supreme Court finally clarified in 1985 the impact of s. 88 on
provincial law. There are, the Court said in Dick 85, "two categories of
provincial laws[:] ... provincial laws which can be applied to Indians
without touching their Indianness, like traffic legislation [, and] provincial
laws which cannot apply to Indians without regulating them qua Indians." 69
It is, the court continued, "to the laws of the second category that s. 88
refers"; 70 "[1]aws of the first category," on the other hand, "continue to
apply to Indians ex proprio vigore, as they always did before the
Jurisdiction," supra note 18 at 453 ("Lamer C.J.C. did not really have his own views on
exclusive federal jurisdiction in mind when he wrote the part of hisjudgment [in Delgamuukw]
dealing with infringement of aboriginal title").
167. See supra notes 111-127 and the accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Cardinal, supra note 73 at 727-728, Laskin J. (dissenting); Natural Parents,
supra note 35 at 759-764, Laskin C.J.C. (for the plurality), 775-776, Martland J., 778-781,
Ritchie J.; Kruger & Manuel, supra note 73 at 115-117; Four B, supra note 71 at 1048-1049.
The dispute was between those for whom s. 88 incorporated by reference all provincial laws
of general application and those who saw it as a mere declaration, for greater certainty, that such
laws applied to Indians of their own force.
169. Dick 85, supra note 73 at 326.
170. Ibid. at 327.
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enactment of s. 88 in 1951 ... and quite apart from s. 88.'' What s. 88
does, in other words, is to incorporate by reference, and apply as federal
law, certain kinds of provincial laws that for constitutional reasons'72
could not otherwise apply to Indians. It leaves undisturbed those provincial
laws that apply of their own force to Indians or on Indian lands.'73
Provincial measures whose application would govern s. 35 rights are
candidates for incorporation pursuant to s. 88 precisely because they
cannot, as such, "apply to Indians without regulating them qua Indians.""4
Section 88, therefore, has at least some potential to assist in bringing s. 35
rights within the reach of such measures. It is clear from the text of s. 88
itself, however, that there are some limits on the assistance that it can
provide, even in the best of circumstances. It is important to identify and
acknowledge those limits.
b. Constraints Internal to Section 88
First, s. 88 by its own terms subordinates all the provincial laws it
incorporates to "the terms of any treaty." By doing so, it gives Indian
171. Ibid. at 326. This must be so, the court concluded, because of s. 88's closing words: "and
except to the extent that those laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made
by or under this Act." Parliament, the court said (ibid. at 327-328), has no authority to prescribe
unilaterally the rules by which its own laws take precedence (have "paramountcy") over valid
and applicable provincial legislation. It may, on the other hand, "validly provide for any type
of paramountcy of the Indian Act over other provisions which it alone could enact, referentially
or otherwise" (ibid. at 328). Peter Hogg acknowledges the authority of this conclusion, but
prefers the view that Parliament does have authority to prescribe a paramountcy rule in
legislation: see Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 19 at 395-396. For additional criticism
and commentary on this issue, see Ryder, supra note 107 at 352-357, 378-381.
172. See supra notes 99-110 and the accompanying text.
173. Since 1985, the court, repeatedly and unanimously, has reaffirmed its support for this
general approach: see, e.g., Derrickson, supra note 62 at 296-297; Francis 88, supra note 42
at 1028-1031; COt, supra note 9 at 191; Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1121-1122.
The Supreme Court, however, has not been entirely conscientious in its application of
this approach. In both Simon, supra note 81 at 410-414 (decided less than a month after Dick
85, supra note 73), and Sioui, supra note 81, at 1065-1066, the court relied on s. 88 to protect
a treaty right from restriction by provincial law, without first considering whether the
provincial law at issue could apply of its own force to the relevant Indians. On other occasions,
majority judgments-in contexts where it did not affect the result-have spoken loosely of
provincial laws applying pursuant to s. 88 without acknowledging the distinction drawn in Dick
85, ibid., between provincial laws that apply of their own force and those that do not. See, e.g.,
Horseman, supra note 117 at 936; Mitchell, supra note 127 at 148, La Forest J. (for himself and
two other judges), and Badger, supra note 6 at 809, quoted in text supra at note 143. In Dick
85, ibid., on the other hand, the s. 88 analysis was essential to the outcome (see ibid. at 328).
For that reason, and because the approach it set out has so often since been affirmed
unanimously, I persist, despite these departures, in the view that Dick 85 is the law.
174. Dick 85, ibid. at 326.
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treaties and the rights they prescribe and protect' 75 virtually complete
ascendancy over the provincial measures to which s. 88 applies:'76 better
quality protection, in fact, than such rights receive from s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982.'7 Because the provinces have no power, except
175. It is now clear that this protection extends to all treaties the Crown makes with Indians,
not just to those involving surrenders of land, and to all rights set out in those treaties, not just
those that the Crown has conferred afresh: see Simon, supra note 81 at 409-410; Sioui, supra
note 81 at 1042-1043.
176. See, e.g., George, supra note 81 at 281 (reference to treaties included in s. 88 "so as to
preclude any interference with rights under treaties resulting from the impact of provincial
legislation"); Kruger & Manuel, supra note 73 at 114-115 ("The Terms of the Treaty are
paramount; in the absence of a treaty provincial laws of general application apply"); Simon,
supra note 81 at 410-414 ("it is clear that under s. 88 of the Indian Act provincial legislation
cannot restrict native treaty rights. If conflict arises, the terms of the treaty prevail": ibid. at
413;"[t]he effect of s. 88 of the Indian Act is to exempt the Indians from provincial legislation
which restricts or contravenes the terms of any treaty": ibid. at 411); Sioui, supra note 81 at
1065 ("Section 88 ... is designed specifically to protect the Indians from provincial legislation
that might attempt to deprive them of rights protected by a treaty"); Sundown, supra note 6 at
418 ("The regulations in issue are provincial laws of general application that, if they were to
apply to Mr. Sundown, would conflict with the treaty. Accordingly, they must give way to 'the
terms of any treaty"'). See also Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 66 at 149 (para. 484).
177. This is so because s. 35(1) leaves room for justification of treaty rights infringements
(see, e.g., supra note 6 and the accompanying text), whereas s. 88 does not: see Cbtg, supra note
9 at 191-192. In C6Ur, the Supreme Court toyed briefly with the idea of eliminating this
discrepancy. Although "[tihe statutory provision does not expressly incorporate ajustification
requirement analogous to the justification stage included in the Sparrow framework," Lamer
C.J.C. observed (ibid. at 192), "I know of no case which has authoritatively discounted the
potential existence of an implicit justification stage under s. 88" (emphasis in original).
Personally, I find this suggestion difficult to accept, either as an interpretation of the
earlier cases (read the quotations set out above at note 176 and judge for yourself) or on its
substantive merits. It would be truly remarkable to discover that Parliament, acting in 1951,
arranged for treaty rights to receive only such protection as they would later turn out to derive
from a 1996 decision of the Supreme Court about a 1982 constitutional document. Anachronisms
aside, it makes perfect sense to suppose that a legislature might want to give greater statutory
protection to certain rights than they would derive, by default, from the constitution. Human
rights codes are an obvious example.
Review of s. 88's legislative history reveals a clear legislative intention to give Indian
treaties absolute priority over conflicting provincial legislation. In 1951, Walter Harris, the
minister responsible, assured aboriginal leaders he had convened to discuss the proposed
revisions to the Indian Act, when they asked about s. 87 (as it then was), "that provincial laws
would not apply if they contravened any treaty, and/or any act of parliament, for example the
Indian Act": Canada, House of Commons Debates, "A Summary of the Proceedings of a
Conference with Representative Indians Held in Ottawa, February 28-March 3, 1951" (16
March 1951) at 1367. On the only occasion when s. 87 received thematic attention in the House
of Commons, the minister assured the special committee reviewing the bill that "it does not
affect their treaty rights at all." The committee, and eventually the House of Commons as a
whole, approved s. 87 on the faith of that representation, having also been informed by senior
department officials that "[i]n mostcases the Indian is not subject to the game laws, particularly
as they relate to hunting and fishing on their own reserves under provincial laws": see Canada,
H.C., Special Committee appointed to consider Bill No. 79: An Act Respecting Indians,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (23 April 1951) at 168, 171, respectively.
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in unusual circumstances, to regulate treaty rights apart from s. 88, the
terms of a treaty prevail over provincial attempts to constrain them.'78 The
most that s. 88 can do, in other words, is to equip provincial measures to
regulate the exercise of existing aboriginal rights.
Second, the only "Indians" to whom s. 88 renders the relevant provincial
measures applicable are statutory Indians: those who qualify as Indians
for purposes of the Indian Act. 79 Provinces, therefore, are powerless,
even with s. 88s assistance, to regulate the existing aboriginal (0i, of
course, treaty) rights of s. 91(24) Indians-Inuit most obviously,180 but
perhaps some Mrtis' 8' and others as well-who do not happen to meet the
current statutory definition of "Indian."
Third, there are important restrictions on the kinds of provincial laws
that s. 88 can incorporate. To begin with, although it can and does
incorporate and extend the reach of valid provincial measures that would
not on their own apply to Indians, s. 88 cannot and does not give any legal
effect to provisions that are themselves entirely beyond provincial
authority.'8 2 Provincial measures whose primary purpose is to regulate
s. 35 rights or whose primary focus is on Indians or Indian lands, for
instance, are and remain invalid, and s. 88 does not "invigorate" them.' "83
In addition, s. 88 incorporates and applies to statutory Indians only
provincial laws'8 4 that are "of general application." Provincial measures
that do not "extend uniformly throughout the territory," or whose policy
is to impair the status or capacity of a particular group, 85 cannot therefore
control the shape or the use of s. 35 rights, even by virtue of s. 88. Finally,
In Sundown, ibid., the Supreme Court declined (at 418) an invitation to pursue, in the
circumstances of that case, the inquiry Lamer C.J.C. had opened in Cbte, ibid.
178. It is even arguable that s. 88 precludes provincial regulation of the treaty rights of
statutory Indians who are not s. 91(24) Indians. This issue, unfortunately, is too complex to
pursue in further detail here.
179. See supra notes 44-53 and the accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 47-48 and the accompanying text.
181. There is still, again, room for controversy about whether-and if so, which-Mrtis are
"Indians" for purposes of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Provinces may very well have
independent authority to regulate, in justified ways, the s. 35 rights of any Mtis who are not
s. 91(24) Indians. See supra notes Il1- 113 and the accompanying text.
182. For explanation of this distinction, see supra notes 99-110 and the accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Dick 85, supra note 73 at 321-322; Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1121-1122;
Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 19 at 330-331, 569.
184. It has been clear since 1966 that s. 88 does not restrict the application of federal law to
Indians: see George, supra note 81 at 281, quoted with emphasis in Kruger & Manuel, supra
note 73 at 109.
185. These are the two criteria, prescribed in Kruger & Manuel, ibid. at 109-112 and
explicated further in Dick 85, supra note 73 at 321-326, for identification of "laws of general
application" for purposes of s. 88.
224 Dalhousie Law Journal
s. 88 refers only to "Indians"; it says nothing about the application of
provincial law to reserves or to Indian lands. That omission has led a
significant number of courts 8 6 and commentators'87 to conclude that
provincial measures have no application to such lands, even pursuant to
s. 88. If this conclusion is sound,'88 it means that s. 88 will not equip
provincial measures to regulate the exercise of aboriginal title, or of other
s. 35 rights insofar as they involve the use of s. 91(24) lands.
The strongest claim one can make in respect of s. 88, therefore, is that
it may make it possible for general provincial laws that are valid in their
own right to govern statutory Indians in their use of aboriginal rights.
Even then, such laws will not govern when, and to the extent that, they
"make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under"
the Indian Act and they may well have no application to the exercise of
such rights anywhere on Indian lands.
186. See, e.g., R. v. Johns (1962), 39 W.W.R. 49 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R.
(2d) 460 (C.A.); Millbrook Indian Band v. Northern Counties Residential Tenancies Board
(1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 175 (N.S.S.C.T.D.), aff'd without reference to the point (1978), 93
D.L.R. (3d) 230 (C.A.); Palm Dairies Ltd. v. The Queen (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 665 (F.C.T.D.);
Park Mobile, supra note 109; The Queen v. Smith (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 522 (F.C.A.), rev'd
on other grounds, without reference to s. 88, by Smith, supra note 38; Re Stony Plain, supra
note 58; R. v. Martin (12 August 1985) (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [unreported]; R. v. Fiddler, [1993]
3 W.W.R. 594 (Sask. Q.B.); Stoney Creek, supra note 66 at 202-205; Chippewas of Sarnia,
supra note 66 at 151-152 (paras. 491-494). For authority that supports a contrary view, see
Boyer v. Canada (1986), 65 N.R. 305 (F.C.A.); Delgamuukiv v. B.C., [1993] 5 W.W.R. 97
(B.C.C.A.) at 172 [hereinafterDelgamuukw (C.A.)] aff'd on the general point by Delgamuukw,
supra note 4.
For relevant dicta from the Supreme Court of Canada, see Cardinal, supra note 73 at 727-
728, Laskin J. (dissenting on other grounds) (s. 88 "deals only with Indians, not with Reserves");
Derrickson, supra note 62 at 297-299 (which considered the arguments but did not decide the
issue); Delganuukw, supra note 4 at 1122 ("s. 88 extends the effect of provincial laws of general
application which cannot apply to Indians and Indian lands because they touch on the Indianness
at the core of s. 91(24)"). Superior courts in both B.C. (Stoney Creek, ibid. at 204-205) and Ontario
(Chippewas of Sarnia, ibid. at 151-152 (para. 493)), however, have held in recent months that this
passage from Delgamuukw should not be taken to have decided the issue.
187. See, e.g., Lysyk, "Unique Position," supra note 38, esp. at 518; P. Hughes, "Indians and
Lands Reserved for the Indians: Off-Limits to the Provinces?" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 82
at 99; Slattery, "Understanding," supra note 50 at 779-781; Sanders, "The Constitution, the
Provinces," supra note 34 at 156, 287 n. 14; L. Little Bear, "Section 88 of the Indian Act and
the Application of Provincial Laws to Indians" in Governments in Conflict, supra note 34 at
187; McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," supra note 18 at 439-440; K. McNeil, "Aboriginal
Title and Section 88 of the Indian Act" (March 1999) [unpublished] at 15-46. For a contrary
view, see P. Monahan & A. Petter, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1985-1986
Term" (1987) 9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 69 at 169-170. Bankes, supra note 18 also discusses the issue
(at 320, n. 12, 328-329, 333-335), but does not take a firm position on it.
188. I believe this issue is much more complicated than most of the courts and commentators
(cited supra at notes 186-187) have acknowledged, but that the prevailing view is probably, on
balance, the better one. But this too must await another day.
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Within this circumscribed range, however, there is some reason to
conclude that s. 88 authorizes provincial legislation to govern the use of
aboriginal rights. Nothing in the text of s. 88 itself protects aboriginal
rights from the impact of the provincial measures it incorporates. And in
Kruger & Manuel, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a submission
that unsurrendered hunting rights should receive the same protection
under s. 88 as treaty rights. "However receptive one may be to such an
argument on cornpassioite gtounds," ttl_ -,-L ... i...Ulu ,
the plain fact is that s. 88 of the Indian Act, enacted by the Parliament of
Canada, provides that 'subject to the terms of any treaty' all laws of general
application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and
in respect of Indians in the province, except as stated. The terms of the
treaty are paramount; in the absence of a treaty provincial laws of general
application apply.'89
Assume, then, that s. 88, to this extent at least, facilitates provincial
control over the use of aboriginal rights: that incorporated provincial
standards, subject to the qualifications already identified, govern aboriginal
rightsjust as they would if they had been enacted federally. 9 ° Even if this
189. Kruger & Manuel, supra note 73 at 114-115.
190. 1 do not mean to suggest that this assumption is either inevitable or clearly sound. In
Kruger & Manuel, ibid. at 108-109, the Supreme Court expressly declined to consider the issue
of aboriginal title. As Kent McNeil recently observed, courts are, strictly speaking at least, still
free to read s. 88 differently when weighing its impact on aboriginal title or on other aboriginal
rights that the constitution now protects: see McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," supra note 18
at 439 n. 38. And on at least two occasions now, the Supreme Court itself has suggested, in
passing, a different view of s. 88's relation to aboriginal rights: see Badger, supra note 6 at 809,
quoted in text accompanying supra note 143; Delganuuk v, supra note 4 at 1122-1123, quoted
below in this note.
McNeil has also recently offered a different, affirmative argument against the assumption
I have made (for convenience) in the text: see McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," ibid. at 437-
439, 447-448. His argument begins from the well-established proposition that neither Crown
nor legislature can extinguish aboriginal rights except by displaying a "clear and plain
intention" to do so: see, e.g., Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1095-1099; Gladstone, supra note 4 at
748-755; Delgamuulv, supra note 4 at 1120, 1122. This is so, in significant part, he continues,
because of the strong interpretative presumption in our law against interference with vested
rights. At common law, however, that presumption operates generally in respect of the
impairment, not just the extinguishment, of such rights: McNeil, ibid. at 438-439, citing
Delganuukw (C.A.), supra note 186 at 155-158. In McNeil's view, therefore, "there appears
to be no reason why the clear and plain test should be applied any less rigorously to
infringement than it is to extinguishment of Aboriginal title" (ibid. at 439). Now in Delgamuukw,
ibid., the Supreme Court concluded (at 1121-1123), as the Court of Appeal had before it (at
172), that s. 88 of the Indian Act did not equip provinces to extinguish aboriginal rights because
it did not disclose a sufficiently clear and plain intention that they were to have the delegated
power to do so. But where, then, McNeil asks (ibid. at 437), "is the clear and plain intent that
s. 88 was meant to permit provincial laws to 'diminish, impair or suspend the exercise of'
aboriginal rights?" The court's observation that s. 88 "was clearly not intended to undermine
Aboriginal rights" (Delgamuukw, ibid. at 1122-1123) suggests, he concludes, "not only that
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assumption is sound, s. 88 cannot have this effect unless such a scheme
can be justified-like any other federal arrangement that regulates
aboriginal rights-in accordance with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982. "9 It is now time, finally, to return to s. 35(1) to see what constraints,
if any, it imposes on s. 88's operation.
c. Section 35's Impact on Section 88
i. What Stands in Need of Justification?
For constitutional reasons, mandatory legislative measures cannot
constrain the exercise of s. 35 rights unless, and except where, any
constraints they would impose upon such rights can be justified. 92 But
how does this requirement govern measures incorporated pursuant to
s. 88 of the Indian Act? Does it mean that provinces are now free to
interfere with the exercise of aboriginal rights whenever they can justify
interference? Or is it the entire arrangement that seems to give them that
power that stands in need of justification in accordance with s. 35(1)?
We still have no guidance on this question from the Supreme Court of
Canada. This very issue arose, however, before the B.C. Court of Appeal
in two companion cases decided in 1993. In both, the Court considered
and rejected the submission that s. 88 itself might be unconstitutional.
Any such submission, it held in the first case, Alphonse,
s. 88 does not authorize extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, but that it does not authorize
infringement of those rights either, as that too would 'undermine' those rights" (McNeil, ibid.
at 448; emphasis in original).
This argument deserves careful consideration on its merits. The approach it proposes to
the infringement inquiry, however, is quite different from the one the courts, so far, have
adopted. Current doctrine distinguishes sharply between infringement and extinguishment
issues (see, e.g., Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 66 at 163 (para. 544)). When addressing
issues of infringement, the Supreme Court has focused almost exclusively on "whether the
legislation in question has the effect of interfering with an existing aboriginal right" (Sparrow,
supra note 2 at 1111 (emphasis added); compare Badger, supra note 6 at 816-820; Nikal, supra
note 4 at 1059- 1061; Gladstone, ibid. at 755-762; Adams, supra note 4 at 130-131; Cbtj, supra
note 9 at 185-189), not on whether it was intended to have any such effect. Only in
extinguishment cases (see, e.g., Sparrow, ibid. at 1095-1099; Gladstone, ibid. at 748-755) has
it even paused to consider what impact the governmental measure at issue may have been
intended to have on aboriginal rights. It is not clear, either, how the justification inquiry, as
described to date, would operate if infringement of such rights necessarily reflected the
undeniable intention of the government responsible.
Intriguing as McNeil's argument is, it may, for these reasons, be too late (or perhaps too
early) for courts to incorporate it into their general approach to aboriginal rights infringement.
If so, it seems to me unlikely that they would single out s. 88 for interpretation and analysis in
these terms.
191. See Delgamuukw (C.A.), ibid. at 172.
192. See, e.g., Nikal, supra note 4 at 1065-1068; Adams, supra note 4 at 133-135; Cti, supra
note 9 at 189-190, 196-197.
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must rest on the premise that aboriginal rights are absolute. Sparrow has
held that aboriginal rights are not absolute and that they may be impaired
or restricted by valid regulations. Thus, a provincial law of general
application, incorporated as federal law by s. 88, may have the effect of
interfering with the exercise of aboriginal rights without being
unconstitutional. 193
Even if s. 88's only function were "the incorporation of derogations from
aboriginal rights," it went on to say,
some interference with aboriginal rights by the effect of provincial law in
combination with s. 88 could be justified. It is true that the incorporation
of provincial laws by s. 88 could produce a result which is inconsistent with
s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982; however, it is the incorporated law
which must be examined and, if necessary, read down to eliminate the
unconstitutional effect. 94
In Dick 93, the companion case, the Court of Appeal put it this way:
the fact that s. 88 referentially incorporates laws that affect Indians qua
Indians does not necessarily mean that s. 88 is inconsistent with s. 35(1).
The purpose of s. 88 is to give effect to provincial laws of general
application. An unconstitutional regulation will not be incorporated as
federal law. The question whether incorporated legislation may be
challenged as violating s. 35(1) is distinct from the issue whether s. 88 is
intra vires the powers of Parliament. Section 88 is an enabling provision.
By itself it does not interfere with the exercise of aboriginal rights. In my
opinion it is not inconsistent with s. 35(1).
If incorporated provincial legislation offends s. 35(1), and fails to meet the
Sparrow tests, it will have no force and effect with respect to Indians by
reason of s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The provisions of s. 88
play no part in that particular constitutional analysis. 95
According to these two decisions, s. 88 is nothing more than a transparent
medium that courts look through, not at, in appraising provincial measures
whose application as federal law interferes with aboriginal rights. If the
impact of the provincial measure, standing alone, can be justified, then
the measure survives and s. 88 gives full effect to it. If it fails the
justification inquiry, then it, not s. 88, is without force or effect.
These conclusions, which also have the endorsement of a majority
panel of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, 96 provide, if sound, a
foundation for the Supreme Court's later suggestion that the provinces
193. Alphonse, supra note 18 at 421.
194. Ibid. at 423.
195. R. v. Dick, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 446 (B.C.C.A.) at 453 [hereinafter Dick 93]. See D.W.
Elliott, "Delgamuukw: Back to Court?" (1998) 26 Man. L.J. 97 at 128 n.161 for recent
expression of a similar view.
196. See R. v. Sundown, [1997] 8 W.W.R. 379 (Sask. C.A.) at 400, aff'd without reference
to the point by Sundown, supra note 6.
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may, after all, infringe aboriginal rights. 97 From a doctrinal standpoint,
however, this conclusion seems to me to be just wrong. In my judgment,
it is s. 88 itself that requires justification. Here is why.
Aboriginal rights, like all other matters situated at the core of enumerated
heads of exclusive federal authority, are matters that the provinces have
never had power of their own to regulate, even in justified ways or for
justified purposes. 98 Provincial measures that make it their business to
regulate or to govern such matters are for that reason invalid. Provincial
measures that would have the effect of regulating such matters are given
an interpretation that denies them that effect, in order to preserve the
validity of their other applications. It is because the courts accept that a
province's controlling intention is to act exclusively within the limits of
its own powers that such measures have any legal force.'99
This circumstance has two key implications for s. 88 analysis. It means
that s. 88 gives the measures it incorporates a range of applications that,
on their own, they could not possibly have. And it means that s. 88 has
given them that additional range despite the fact that-and only because-
the originating province intended, by necessary constitutional hypothesis,
that they not have it.
These implications, in turn, tell us two extremely important things
about the aboriginal rights infringements that result from measures that
s. 88 incorporates. First, such infringements are possible exclusively
because of s. 88's intercession. Nothing the province itself could do could
restrict, in any enforceable way, the exercise of such rights. Second, when
such infringements occur, they occur in spite of the province's own
controlling intention that its own measures give rise to no such result.
Finally, when such measures take on the character of federal law, their
implementation and enforcement in that capacity is, necessarily and
appropriately, subject to federal policy, priorities and discretion.2" To the
extent that provincial officials participate with authority in the
197. See Delgamuukav, supra note 4 at 1107, quoted in text supra note 134.
198. See supra notes 57-110 and the accompanying text. I ignore for present purposes the
exceptional circumstances already identified (see supra notes 111-127 and the accompanying
text), with which s. 88 has nothing to do in any event.
199. See supra notes 99-110 and the accompanying text.
200. It would be a denial of the basic concept of federalism to permit the provincial
authorities to have exclusive control of the enforcement of [the relevant federal]
legislation and the sole determination as to how and when the legislation should be
enforced by institution of prosecution or against whom such prosecution should be
instituted. If the legislative field is within the enumerated heads in s. 91 [of the
Constitution Act, 1867], then the final decision as to administrative policy, investigation
and prosecution must be in federal hands:
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administration of such measures in respect of statutory Indians, they do
so, strictly speaking, pursuant to federal instructions and to delegated
federal authority.
All such infringements occur, therefore, notjust because of federal, not
provincial, activity and decisions, but also pursuant to federal objectives,
not provincial ones. These federal decisions, activity and objectives, I am
arguing, are what need justification under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982. In the constitutional sense, the provinces have nothing to do with
them. If Canada had chosen instead to enact, one by one, its own measures
duplicating, for Indians, the effects of selected existing provincial laws,
no one would suggest that any s. 35 inquiry should focus exclusively-
or at all-on the inapplicable provincial prototypes. In one respect, s. 88
does exactly that, only by different means.
There are some important differences, though, between the real s. 88
and a free-standing duplicate federal scheme. Because of them, it is
simply unsound to suggest that s. 88's operation is justified in a given
instance if and only if the infringing provincial measure it incorporates
can be justified. To begin with, as we have seen at length, the provincial
measure incorporated stands in no need of justification because it is
incapable, as such, of infringing aboriginal rights. There are at least two
other reasons, though.
First, we know from Sparrow and later Supreme Court decisions that
there can be no justification for infringing an aboriginal right unless the
infringement is in service of a compelling and substantial objective.2 ' (At
least twice already, the Supreme Court has dismissed a federal effort at
justification because the objective on which it was based was not
compelling or substantial enough.2 "2 ) We know too, though, that s. 88
itself exists to serve objectives different from those that animate the
provincial measures it incorporates. This is necessarily true, again,
because it cannot be an objective of a valid provincial measure to seek,
for whatever reason, to include aboriginal rights within some otherwise
general scheme of regulation or control. But even apart from that, it is
clear that s. 88 exists to do different work from that done by the provincial
measures it incorporates. Those measures themselves have controlling
R. v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984 at 1004, Spence J. (concurring), approved in CN Transportation,
supra note 27 at 238,244 (confirming exclusive federal authority to determine who prosecutes
offences created under federal law). See also St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 50 at 59,
quoted in text at supra note 67 ("to ensure uniformity of administration," Constitution Act,
1867 placed control over Indian affairs "under the legislative control of one central authority").
201. See, e.g., Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1113; Nikal, supra note 4 at 1064; Gladstone, supra
note 4 at 762, 773-775; Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1111.
202. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 4 at 133-134; Cbtd, supra note 9 at 189.
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objectives such as conservation, public safety, certainty and finality in
transactions, or whatever; "[t]he purpose of s. 88," on the other hand,
according to the B.C. Court of Appeal in Dick 93, "is to give effect to
provincial laws of general application. '2°3 Whatever else one may think
of them, such second-order objectives as those underlying s. 88 raise
different justification issues from those raised by such first-order issues
as conservation or safety. An inquiry into s. 88's own justifiability,
therefore, must be independent of any possible inquiry into the merits of
any of the provincial laws it incorporates, because its controlling objectives
are both numerically and qualitatively different from any of theirs.
Second, the Supreme Court, in a closely related context, has expressly
rejected such an approach. Consider the following lengthy passage from
Adams:
In a normal setting under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
where a statute confers a broad, unstructured administrative discretion
which may be exercised in a manner which encroaches upon a constitutional
right, the court should not find that the delegated discretion infringes the
Charter and then proceed to a consideration of the potential justifications
of the infringement under s. 1. Rather, the properjudicial course is to find
that the discretion must subsequently be exercised in a manner which
accommodates the guarantees of the Charter...
I am of the view that the same approach should not be adopted in
identifying infringements under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In
light of the Crown's unique fiduciary obligations towards aboriginal
peoples, Parliament may not simply adopt an unstructured discretionary
administrative regime which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a substantial
number of applications in the absence of some explicit guidance. If a
statute confers an administrative discretion which may carry significant
consequences for the exercise of an aboriginal right, the statute or its
delegate regulations must outline specific criteria for the granting or
refusal of that discretion which seek to accommodate the existence of
aboriginal rights. In the absence of such specific guidance, the statute will
fail to provide representatives of the Crown with sufficient directives to
fulfil their fiduciary duties, and the statute will be found to represent an
infringement of aboriginal rights under the Sparrow test.2"a
Adams dealt with conferral of administrative discretion, not with adoption
by reference of provincial legislation, but the two settings nonetheless
have some striking structural parallels. The scheme at issue inAdams left
the exercise of the appellant's aboriginal fishing rights at the mercy of a
minister's discretion; s. 88 exposes a broader range of aboriginal rights
203. Dick 93, supra note 195 at 453, quoted at more length in text at supra note 195.
204. Adams, supra note 4 at 131-132 (emphasis in original).
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to an indefinite, and constantly changing, array of provincial procedures
and standards all of which, upon incorporation into federal law, operate
to govern matters constitutive of Indianness. TheAdams scheme contained
no specifications or criteria that could have helped ensure that the
minister gave sufficient regard, in the exercise of the discretion, to the
existence and the scope of any aboriginal right; s. 88 contains no
specifications that help ensure that any schemes it incorporates will
operate with sufficient regard for aboriginal rights.
The option the Court considered and specifically rejected in Adams
would have provided for case-by-case review, according to Sparrow
standards, of decisions taken in the exercise of the minister's discretion
under the fisheries regulations. That, as the Court acknowledged, is what
ordinarily would have happened if the issue had been a Charter
infringement instead of a contravention of s. 35. It chose a different path
for s. 35, as I read Adams, because of the federal government's fiduciary
obligation to aboriginal peoples. What Adams makes clear is that the
federal order of government has an enforceable obligation, when conferring
a discretion, to take care from the outset that the discretion not be used to
interfere unacceptably with aboriginal rights. After-the-fact adjudication
of particular instances, the Court insisted, is not good enough.
Exactly the same considerations should govern our understanding of
s. 88. The Supreme Court in Adams characterized the scheme it was
appraising there as "an unstructured discretionary administrative regime
which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a substantial number of
applications in the absence of some explicit guidance"; 05 s. 88 is the
statutory equivalent. The approach the Alphonse court adopted-after-
the-fact consideration of the impacts of particular measures, or even of
their specific provisions-would make it impossible for the courts to
confront the structural threat that s. 88 itself represents to aboriginal
rights.
The difference between s. 88 and specific federal measures crafted to
duplicate, with some particularity, for Indians the impact individual
provincial measures have on everyone else is that the federal government,
in designing such particular measures, must turn its mind to the impact
they will have on aboriginal rights and decide what it intends to do about
it. The effect of s. 88, on the other hand, is to incorporate-essentially
whole, with no prior review, and with no provision for protection of
aboriginal rights-whole chunks of changing provincial law because
those measures, once incorporated, will govern matters integral to
205. Ibid. at 132, quoted at length in text at supra note 204.
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Indianness. 2°6 This is just the kind of enterprise that ought to engage the
enforceable federal obligation, articulated in Adams, to take care in
designing measures that they be mindful of aboriginal rights. °7
This argument in no way rests, as the court in Alphonse supposed, "on
the premise that aboriginal rights are absolute. ' 20 8 It assumes that s. 88,
like any other federal measure that constrains aboriginal rights, is
susceptible to justification. If the federal government can justify, in
accordance with the standards prescribed under s. 35, a blanket
incorporation of provincial legislation, with or without a subsequent
case-by-case review of particular measures, then s. 88 deserves to stand.
If it cannot, on the other hand, then provincial measures, generally
speaking, can have no enforceable impact on the exercise of aboriginal
rights. Any such conclusion, however, flows not from a court's assessment
of the merits of s. 88, but from the structure of the constitution itself.09
ii. Can Section 88 Be Justified?
Can the federal governmentj ustify, in the manner that Sparrow prescribes,
the shifting and generic constraints that s. 88 imposes on the use of
aboriginal rights? In my judgment, the answer must be no.
Let us assume (though one could argue the point) that the objectives
that s. 88 exists to serve -filling gaps in the federal law and harmonizing
the legal regimes to which statutory Indians will be subject from time to
time-are compelling and substantial enough to anchor a s. 35justification.
Even on this assumption, s. 88 will be justified only if it serves those
objectives in a justified manner. In appraising whether Canada's means
of pursuing these ends is justified, we must inquire, among other things,
"whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect
the desired result," and whether it demonstrates sufficient "sensitivity to
and respect for the rights of aboriginal peoples. 2 °
I do not believe that s. 88 can meet these standards, even if we
acknowledge, as Nikal, with reason, says we must, that an infringement
206. See supra notes 168-174 and the accompanying text.
207. Compare McNeil, "Rethinking Jurisdiction," supra note 18 at 440-441:
the honour of the Crown is at stake in its dealings with the Aboriginal peoples. How
would that honour be upheld by Parliamentary delegation of authority to the provinces
to infringe Aboriginal rights through the mechanism of referential incorporation?
Would this not be a dishonourable abdication of the responsibility that was placed
primarily on the federal government by s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867?
208. Alphonse, supra note 18 at 421, quoted at more length in text at supra note 193.
209. See supra notes 57-166 and the accompanying text.
210. Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1119.
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will meet these tests "[s]o long as ... in the context ... [it] could
reasonably be considered to be as minimal as possible."' As drafted, it
makes no allowance whatever for aboriginal rights, either by according
them some statutory priority (as it did for treaty rights), 1 2 or by requiring
some prior review of incorporated statutes to ensure some threshold of
sensitivity or of proportionality. 2 3 A version with either or both of these
features would serve s. 88's purposes substantially less obtrusively. As is,
its operation assumes that all provincial laws that meet its requirements
ought to govern statutory Indians, even-indeed, especially-in the
matters characteristic of Indians as such, 21 4 irrespective of the impact such
laws may have on aboriginal rights. If this result is ajustifiable consequence
of a federal effort to complement and harmonize the mainstream legal
regime, then aboriginal rights have no independent weight in our
constitutional order.21
5
For all these reasons, the better view is that s. 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982 deprives s. 88 of its force and effect as against aboriginal rights.
2 16
This, of course, does not necessarily mean that s. 88 is simply
unconstitutional; the courts might well elect to read it down, in the usual
way, so that it might survive to do other work.217 So understood, it could
continue to make use of eligible provincial legislation to regulate matters
unrelated to s. 35 rights but otherwise integrally related to Indianness.
What it could not do is equip the provinces, even notionally, to control the
use of aboriginal rights.
Conclusion
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and affirms the
existing treaty and aboriginal rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
One of the most important questions that remains unresolved even now,
211. Nikal, supra note 4 at 1065. Compare Gladstone, supra note 4 at 767-768.
212. See supra notes 175-178, 189-191 and the accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 204-207 and the accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 168-174 and the accompanying text.
215. There might be reason to moderate this conclusion if there were evidence that s. 88 had
been enacted in response to some emergency. There is, however, no such evidence. Section 88
was only one of several new measures included in the thoroughgoing Indian Act revision
enacted in 1951 (as S.C. 1951, c. 29). That enactment culminated a deliberative process that
had begun in 1946. For a brief description of that process, see Canada, House of Commons,
Debates, 21st Parl., 2d session, 3936 (21 June 1950).
216. For an earlier, different argument that reaches the same conclusion, see Slattery,
"Question of Trust," supra note 97 at 285-286.
217. The Supreme Court has already given two suggestive but inconclusive indications that
this is its view of s. 88. See Badger, supra note 6 at 809, quoted in text at supra note 143;
Delgarnuukw, supra note 4 at 1122-1123, supra note 190.
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almost twenty years after s. 35 first came into force, concerns the extent
of provincial power to regulate the exercise of such rights.
The Supreme Court's decision in Delgamuukw has undoubtedly
intensified lawyers' interest in this issue, but also, alas, their confusion
about it, because of the principaljudgment' s conflicting messages. On the
one hand, it asserts quite clearly that provinces may indeed interfere, in
justified ways, with the exercise of s. 35 rights;"8 on the other, it has told
us that such rights lie within the essential core of exclusive federal
authority over Indians and Indian lands, and therefore, as a general rule,
beyond the provinces' reach even apart from s. 35.29
The purpose of this article has been to examine this issue, and these two
propositions, within the larger context of the Canadian constitutional
order. As it turns out, the latter of these two contrary messages, on which
the Supreme Court relied in concluding that provinces have no authority
to extinguish s. 35 rights, is fully consistent with established Canadian
constitutional doctrine; indeed, it follows necessarily from the original
distribution of governmental powers and from the Court's own earlier
definition of aboriginal rights. That doctrine, however, does not just
preclude the provinces from extinguishing such rights; it also denies them
authority to regulate their exercise. In subsequent jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has used Delgamuukw as authority for this broader
limitation on the scope of provincial power.20 The former message in
Delgamuukw, in comparison, fares much less well. Nothing in that
decision depends upon the Supreme Court's assertion that provinces may
infringe s. 35 rights; moreover, that assertion itself draws no support from
the authorities cited there in its defence. We cannot regard it as a
repudiation of recognized principles that limit the scope of provincial
authority, because the Supreme Court has reaffirmed those principles in
Delgamuukw itself and subsequently. There is no plausible basis on
which to conclude that the 1982 amendments to the constitution gave the
provinces new authority over s. 35 rights. And s. 35 itself precludes both
orders of government from relying on s. 88 of the Indian Act to give effect
for that purpose to otherwise valid provincial measures.
218. Delgamuukw, ibid., esp. at 1107. For discussion, see supra notes 134-136 and the
accompanying text.
219. Ibid. at 1116-1121.
220. See Ordon Estate, supra note 33 at 497-498, quoted supra note 157.
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The provinces, therefore, remain without power to limit, even in
justified ways, the use of s. 35 rights by s. 91(24) Indians or on s. 91(24)
lands, 22' except in a very few extraordinary circumstances: where special
provisions in treaties or constitutional instruments give them specific
authority to do so; where they themselves have validly made affirmative
promises in treaties, or where, for constitutional reasons, the federal
government needs the cooperation of a province to implement treaty
promises of its own. 2
22
If this analysis is correct the consequences may be profound and, for
some, profoundly disturbing. We in non-native society have become
quite attached to the notion that we have the capacity, at the end of the day,
to ensure that our own arrangements prevail. It may indeed be disconcerting
to find, in respect of one of our constitutive orders of government, that that
capacity is now in doubt. Disconcerting or not, it is a conclusion that
seems to me inescapable based on the structure of our constitution, as
interpreted by any number of judicial decisions of the highest authority.
I frankly see no principled basis on which to resile from it. This is, to all
appearances, the business we have chosen, and we are going to have to
find a way, together, to make the best of it.
221. It makes sense, however, to suppose that provinces may control the exercise elsewhere
of such rights by any aboriginal peoples who are not s. 91(24) Indians. See supra notes Ill -
113 and the accompanying text.
222. For discussion of these exceptions, see supra notes 114-127 and the accompanying text.
